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Abstract
The present paper aims to complement the traditional Graham-
KSR obviousness framework by extrapolating the well-established
"lead compound" approach used in the obviousness analysis of new
chemical compounds across all fields of innovative endeavor. This
extrapolation is designed to provide proponents and opponents of
prima facie obviousness for a particular claimed invention, judges,
and patent examiners with tools to analyze obviousness to an
improved degree of objectivity. To that end, the authors present a
methodology for identifying those pieces of prior art ("Lead Prior
Art") that the mythical person of ordinary skill in the art
("POSITA"), without employing hindsight, would have selected for
subsequent modification at the time that the invention was made. That
method is based on identification of starting point(s) for further
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liability is disclaimed.
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innovation that one of ordinary skill in the art would have selected
based on the relevant available information at the time the invention
was made, as statutorily required. "Relevant available information"
includes teachings or suggestions in the prior art as well as
inferences that would have been apparent to a POSITA based on
ordinary creativity and common sense. In general, any information
properly available to a POSITA that is capable of elevating the
desirability of one or more potential starting points over others is
relevant to the identification of the Lead Prior Art. In some situations,
the Lead Prior Art's potential for modification to achieve the claimed
invention may have been very apparent or even certain to a POSITA,
given the relevant information that would have been available to the
POSITA. In other situations, however, a POSITA's ability to have
achieved the claimed invention given the Lead Prior Art may
implicate questions of lack of straightforwardness and "reasonable
expectations of success." Once Lead Prior Art is selected,
modifications to that Lead Prior Art may be identified and evaluated
to determine whether a POSITA could have achieved the claimed
invention from the Lead Prior Art. That evaluation is then used in a
determination of nonobviousness or of prima facie obviousness. Thus,
rather than making a single, and quite possibly relatively dificult,
determination of whether the differences between the prior art and the
claimed invention as a whole would have been prima facie obvious,
our methodology allows that difficult determination, given
appropriate facts, to be partitioned into several simpler, objective
determinations that lead to a deduction that the claimed invention is
either nonobvious or prima facie obvious. A major goal, of course, is
to reduce problems caused by hindsight bias, "pigeonholing, " and/or
lack of harmonized analytical methodology. Accordingly, we present
our proposal, essentially a synthesis and extension of existing
principles, as a step forward in obviousness analysis that can be
utilized by patent prosecutors, patent litigators, and decision makers
at both the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO")
and in the relevant U.S. courts.
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I. INTRODUCTION
There comes a point when the question [of patentable novelty]
must be resolved by a subjective opinion as to what seems like an
easy step and what does not. We must try to correct our standard
by such objective references as we can, but in the end the judgment
will appear, and no doubt be, to a large extent personal, and in that
sense arbitrary. -Judge Learned Hand1
We can easily forgive a child who is afraid of the dark; the real
tragedy of life is when men are afraid of the light. -Plato 2
The Patent Act of 1952 is widely recognized as the greatest
contribution to American patent law of the twentieth century. One of
its key components was 35 U.S.C. § 103, which established an
objective test for patentability: whether a person of ordinary skill in
the art would have found the claimed invention to be "obvious."4
Development of this objective test came in direct response5 to
1. Kirsch Mfg. Co. v. Gould Mersereau Co., 6 F.2d 793, 794 (2d Cir. 1925) (Hand, L.,
J.). Although a careful reader may notice that Learned Hand's quotation from 1925 predates the
1952 creation of 35 U.S.C. § 103, Learned Hand's quotation nonetheless pertains to the same
patentable novelty question whose current standard, from § 103, we now refer to as
"obviousness." Case law dating from at least the Supreme Court's Hotchkiss decision in 1850
held that a minor variation from the prior art was not patentable even if the claimed invention
was technically "novel" (i.e., "new." See Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (1 How.) 248
(1850)). Courts and patent examiners since at least Hotchkiss have struggled mightily to
determine whether variations from the prior art were "minor" and thus unpatentable, as
discussed infra.
2. BoB KELLY, WORTH REPEATING: MORE THAN 5000 CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY
QUOTES 120 (Kregel Academic & Professional 2003).
3. See George Sirilla, 35 U.SC. § 103: From Hotchkiss to Hand to Rich, The Obvious
Patent Law Hall-of-famers, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 437, 557 (1999) ("As we near the end of
the 20th Century, we see that our country's patent system is not only alive and well, but
flourishing. That condition is due in no small part to the 1952 enactment of the 103 standard,
and the vision and unremitting efforts of Learned Hand and Giles Rich in developing and
propagating that standard.").
4. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 103(a).
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or
described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to
a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was
made.
Id.
5. See S.R. Rep. No. 82-1979, at 6 (1952) ("[Future § 103] paraphrases language which
has often been used in decisions of the courts, and the section is added to the statute for
uniformity and definiteness. This section should have a stabilizing effect and minimize great
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uncertain6 and purely subjective tests7 for patentability that courts
applied prior to § 103. Although the evils of subjectivity may be
impossible to completely remove from patentability determinations,8
considerable reduction in the amount of subjectivity employed during
patentability determinations seemed necessary. Enactment of § 103
represented a leap forward in that regard.
Judge Rich described the benefits of § 103 as follows:
The question will, of course, be asked, "What difference does [the
addition of § 103] make, it must still be a subjective decision?"
True, but now the statute provides a standard according to which
the subjective decision must be made. There is a vast difference
between basing a decision on exercise of the inventive or creative
faculty, or genius, ingenuity, patentable novelty, flashes, surprises
and excitement, on the one hand, and basing it on unobviousness to
one of ordinary skill on the other. It is possible to determine what
art is involved, what type of skill is possessed by ordinary workers
in it, and come to some conclusion as to what "ordinary skill"
would be at a given time. This may present knotty problems but it
is a definite pattern of thinking and does not leave the Patent
Office or the courts free to conclude that a thing is not patentable
for any old reason and then stand on the proposition that something
indefinable and impalpable called "invention" was not involved.
At least they have to talk in terms of obviousness to a man of
ordinary skill in the art. While the ultimate decision as to what his
skill would be and what would be obvious to him is subjective, it is
one definite proposition on which evidence can be adduced. The
best the courts could do in the past was to assume, under certain
sets of circumstances such as the existence of a long-felt want and
departures which have appeared in some cases.").
6. See Giles S. Rich, Why and How Section 103 Came to Be, in NONOBVIOUSNESS -
THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY 1:201-07 (John F. Witherspoon ed., 1980)
(Speaking about the "invention" legal standard for determining whether a claimed invention was
worthy of patent protection, author of § 103 and former Federal Circuit Judge Giles Sutherland
Rich (Judge Rich) stated: "' [i]nvention' was that 'beautiful uncertainty in the law' from which
the Patent Bar made its living-practicing what was essentially a mystery.").
7. See Sirilla, supra note 3, at 472 ("The attitude of the Supreme Court toward patents
from the turn of the century to before 1930 was mixed. At times, the Court used the Hotchkiss
test, or variations of it, and at other times it used the so-called subjective tests, such as the
'inventive genius' test, the 'creative faculties' test, and the like.").
8. Consolidated Rubber Tire Co. v. Diamond Rubber Co., 226 F. 455, 464 (2d Cir.
1915) (L. Hand, J.) ("At just what step of novelty the ingenuity of the skilled artisan becomes
transmuted into the genius of an inventor, men will always differ, and their differences will be
very largely dependent upon personal beliefs too remote for successful statement."); see also
Sirilla, supra note 3, at 451 ("'The problem of what is obvious and hence not patentable is still
of necessity one of judgment."') (quoting P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 35
U.S.C.A. 1, 23 (1954)).
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an immediate market acceptance of an invention, that there must
have been "invention." 9
Nonetheless, "obviousness" has been and remains a frequently
litigated issue in patent law,' 0 as well as "the most common rejection
made by patent examiners."" The underlying determination-
whether a claimed invention is sufficiently novel to justify patent
protection 2--has been characterized as one of the most difficult
determinations in the field of law.13 That situation does not diminish
the contributions that § 103 has brought to patent law, but it reflects
that further evolution is needed. Although § 103 brought a large
measure of objectivity to questions of patentability,14  hindsight
remains an inherent and significant influence on an obviousness
analysis.' 5  As any judge, patent examiner, or patent practitioner
realizes, anything can appear obvious when viewed with hindsight.' 6
Case law applying § 103 involves several objective factual
determinations, collectively known as the Graham' factors, which
include ascertaining "the differences between the claimed invention
9. Giles S. Rich, Principles ofPatentability, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 393, 406 (1960).
10. See DONALD S. CHISUM, 2 CHISUM ON PATENTS § 5.06 (2003) ("The nonobviousness
requirement of Section 103 is the most important and most litigated of the conditions of
patentability."); Samson Vermont, A New Way to Determine Obviousness: Applying the Pioneer
Doctrine to 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), 29 AIPLA Q.J. 375, 379-80 n.5 (2001) ("In the litigation
context, validity challenges based on obviousness are more common than those based on
novelty. Litigated patents are almost twice as likely to be found invalid for section 103 reasons
than for section 102 'prior art reasons' .... ) (citing John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley,
Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 208 (1998) and
George Edwards, That Clumsy Word Nonobviousness, 60 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 3,
5-6 (1978)).
11. Sirilla, supra note 3, at 444 (Statement by Judge Giles Rich of the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit).
12. See Bonito Boats Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 148 (1989)
("[Flederal patent law has been about the difficult business 'of drawing a line between the things
which are worth to the public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and those which are
not.") (quoting 13 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 335 (Memorial ed. 1904)).
13. See Harries v. Air King Products Co., 183 F.2d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 1950) (Judge
Learned Hand expressed this sentiment well, prior to § 103, more than sixty years ago: "[T]he
question [of] whether there is a patentable invention . . . is as fugitive, impalpable, wayward,
and vague a phantom as exists in the whole paraphernalia of legal concepts.").
14. See discussion infra Section II.A.
15. Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the
Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391, 1391 (2006)
("[T]he hindsight problem pervades patent law to an extent not previously recognized").
16. See Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consolidated Rubber Tire Co., 220 U.S. 428, 435 (1911)
("Knowledge after the event is always easy, and problems once solved present no
difficulties[.]").
17. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
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and the prior art"18 in view of the scope and content of the prior art
and the level of skill in the art. Yet, problematically, the current
structural barriers to applying hindsight during obviousness analysis
sometimes lie only in economic secondary consideration evidence of
sometimes limited persuasive power,'9 a statutory requirement to
evaluate obviousness at the time of the invention,20 and a requirement
21to establish a reason to combine or modify prior art references. In
practice, none of those current barriers, however, successfully
vaccinates against hindsight.22
Hindsight during an obviousness analysis is particularly
seductive when a factfinder has knowledge of an inventor's
solution.23 Such hindsight often presents itself in the form of a
primary prior art reference and several supporting prior art references
that would not necessarily exist together outside the artificial
environment of the obviousness analysis made in plain view of
inventor's solution. A party advocating obviousness can thus easily
work backwards from the inventor's solution to identify the
references needed to support a prima facie case of obviousness.
For example, the primary reference may teach certain elements
of the claimed invention but may not be a realistic starting point for
creating the invention. Additionally, the secondary references may
teach or suggest any claim elements not taught by the primary
reference, but, except for hindsight, those references may not fit
18. See discussion infra Section II.A.
19. See discussion infra Section III.
20. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 103(a)..
21. See Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc.,
617 F.3d 1296, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ("But it is not enough to simply show that the references
disclose the claim limitations; in addition, 'it can be important to identify a reason that would
have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine the elements as the new invention
does."') (quoting KSR v. Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 401 (2007)); Exparte Ravi
Subramanyam, No. 2010-002463, 2010 WL 1253713, at *3 (B.P.A.I. March 29, 2010) ("While
the analysis under 35 U.S.C. § 103 allows flexibility in determining whether a claimed invention
would have been obvious, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007), it still
requires showing that 'there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the
fashion claimed by the patent at issue.' Id. 'We must still be careful not to allow hindsight
reconstruction of references to reach the claimed invention without any explanation as to how or
why the references would be combined to produce the claimed invention.' Innogenetics, N.V. v.
Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363, 1374 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2008).").
22. See Mandel, supra note 15, at 1421-25 (discussing the ineffectiveness of secondary
consideration evidence).
23. See id. at 1403 n.41 ("once an outcome is known, 'it becomes difficult to accurately
reconstruct a previous state of mind') (citing David A. Schkade & Lynda M. Kilbourne,
Expectation-Outcome Consistency and Hindsight Bias, 49 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAv. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 105, 108 (1991)); see also discussion infra Section II.C.
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together with the primary reference in the context of the problem that
the inventor faced or that the hypothetical person of ordinary skill in
the art ("POSITA") would face in trying to innovate further.2 4 Thus,
such references are not an accurate indication of whether an invention
at the time it was made would have been prima facie obvious.
Accordingly, the Graham factors, if not accurately applied, can
unfairly prejudice a patentability determination in favor of a finding
of obviousness and thus unpatentability.25
After discussing the current obviousness framework, this article
analyzes the "lead compound" approach the Federal Circuit has
applied when assessing obviousness of new chemical compounds. In
those cases, in an attempt to avoid hindsight, the Federal Circuit
analyzed the context in which a patent challenger (1) selected the
starting compounds ("lead compounds") and then (2) suggested
subsequent modifications to these lead compounds to allege that the
claimed chemical compounds would have been prima facie obvious.26
In particular, the Federal Circuit expressly engaged in a determination
of whether the prior art compounds proposed by the patent challenger
would have been the compounds that a POSITA would have chosen
as starting points for further innovation, based on an analysis of all
relevant information available at the time the invention was made.27
Based on the legal framework from the "lead compound" cases,
and as a first step of this methodology, we propose a process for
selecting the proper prior art ("Lead Prior Art") that should be used in
a prima facie obviousness analysis. This methodology aims to avoid
hindsight and is consistent with the application of the Graham factors
requiring consideration of the scope and content of the prior art in
view of the POSITA's level of skill. Our methodology proposes a
selection of prior art that discloses promising options to solve any
problem for which the claimed invention could potentially be a
solution. In general, any information that would have properly been
24. In considering "the problem that the inventor faced" the authors of course take into
the account the possibility that the inventor and POSITA do not necessarily have to face the
same problem. See discussion infra Section IV.D.
25. See Mandel, supra note 15 (although the Graham factors provide a very helpful and
legally binding framework for assessing obviousness, the results achieved through conscientious
application of the Graham factors empirically indicate a clear bias in favor of finding
obviousness).
26. See, e.g., Takeda Chemical Indus., Ltd. v. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350,
1356-57 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Daiichi Sankyo Co., Ltd. v. Matrix Labs., Ltd., 619 F.3d 1346 (Fed.
Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 2011 WL 940897 (Mar 21, 2011).
27. See Takeda Chemical Indus., 492 F.3d at 1356-57; Daiichi Sankyo Co., 619 F.3d at
1346.
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available to the POSITA that would have been useful in determining
the desirability of one or more potential starting points is relevant to
identification of the Lead Prior Art. Relevant available information
includes teachings or suggestions in the prior art as well as inferences
that would have been apparent to a POSITA based on ordinary
creativity and common sense.
Once the factfinder selects one or more pieces or teachings of
Lead Prior Art, the second step of this methodology provides for
identifying and evaluating modifications of that Lead Prior Art to
determine whether a POSITA would have had a reason to pursue one
or more modifications to achieve the claimed invention. The process
for identifying modifications to the Lead Prior Art parallels
identification of the Lead Prior Art in important ways; all "relevant
available information" would be considered. For example, this
relevant available information includes teachings or suggestions in the
prior art as well as inferences that would have been apparent to a
POSITA based on ordinary creativity and common sense and are
useful in determining the desirability of one or more potential
modifications to the Lead Prior Art over others to achieve the claimed
invention.
Once one or more modifications have been identified, the
decision maker can draw informed conclusions of nonobviousness or
of prima facie obviousness. For example, identification of the Lead
Prior Art and identification of one or more modifications that would
have allowed a POSITA to achieve the claimed invention in a
straightforward manner justifies a conclusion of prima facie
obviousness if reasonable expectations of success would have existed
for the POSITA. By contrast, an inability to identify the Lead Prior
Art that would have allowed a POSITA to achieve the claimed
invention in a straightforward way or with a reasonable expectation of
success, justifies a conclusion of nonobviousness.
In factual circumstances where all starting points and all
available modifications could be exhaustively considered (i.e., where
all prior art and suggestions therein, as well as all inferences
therefrom are known and considered), a conclusion of
nonobviousness per se would be logically appropriate if a Lead Prior
Art could not be identified that could have led to the claimed
invention. Conclusions of nonobviousness per se, however, would
only be appropriate where the prior art is exhaustively identified.
Thus, no "undiscovered" art or inferences therefrom would be
possible. Factual practical circumstances that judges, practitioners,
and patent examiners face may rarely lead to a conclusion of
LEAD PRIOR ART METHODOLOGY
nonobviousness per se, based on practical considerations of existing-
but-undiscovered art in crowded fields.
By reducing a relatively difficult determination into a series of
relatively easy determinations that allow for a deduction of
nonobviousness or of prima facie obviousness, objectivity, reliability,
and transparency of the determination can be significantly improved.
When properly applied, Lead Prior Art provides a methodology for
obviousness analysis that at least asymptotically approaches an
objective analysis. Thus, proper application of Lead Prior Art may
allow proponents of obviousness to make more persuasive arguments
of prima facie obviousness. Additionally, opponents of obviousness
and factfinders may analyze the veracity of such arguments more
critically than would be possible under the existing obviousness
rubric.
In addition to facilitating a logical and transparent obviousness
determination, Lead Prior Art is designed to harmonize various
principles and "negative rules for invention"28 into a related set of
affirmative considerations. Through that harmonization, a frequently-
lamented aspect of patent law can be reduced or eliminated: a
tendency for parties debating obviousness to characterize the claims
at issue as fitting neatly within one of a series of discrete factual
29
scenarios (i.e., to "pigeonhole" the claims). Under the existing
obviousness rubric, if a litigant or patent examiner is successful in
fitting a claim into a "negative rule for invention" (e.g., "obvious to
try,"30 "known elements achieving predictable results"'31, etc.), a
finding of prima facie obviousness is difficult to avoid
notwithstanding other legitimate patentability considerations.3 2 By
turning the "negative rules for invention" into affirmatives that are
part of an overall framework, Lead Prior Art diminishes or removes
incentives for any participant 33 in the obviousness analysis to
28. See CHISUM, supra note 10, at § 5.04[5][a] ("Negative Rules for Invention"); see also
Sirilla, supra note 3, at 442 (referring to "negative tests for invention").
29. See In re Dillon, 892 F.2d 1554, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("We join the [United States
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals] in deploring the 'formal exercise of squeezing new
factual situations into preestablished pigeonholes."') (quoting In re Yates, 663 F.2d 1054, 1056
n.4 (C.C.P.A. 1981)), withdrawn and superseded on reh'g, 919 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
30. See discussion infra Section II.A.2.
31. See discussion infra Section II.A.2.
32. See discussion infra Section V.D.
33. Although the examples of factual scenarios noted above involve arguments of prima
facie obviousness, any participant in an obviousness analysis could fall victim to pigeonholing:
a proponent of obviousness, an opponent of obviousness inappropriately arguing "unexpected
results," and even a judge or patent examiner.
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pigeonhole claims or place undue reliance on argument rather than
objective analysis.
The harmonizing effect of Lead Prior Art should preclude
disrupting any settled expectations relative to the existing obviousness
framework,34 except in cases where hindsight was an influential yet
inappropriate factor in outcomes. Accordingly, Lead Prior Art should
provide consistency with existing case law in many settings and
enhanced clarity, transparency, and intellectual defensibility in
difficult cases. For these reasons, we believe that the Lead Prior Art
methodology is a worthy extension of the objective test introduced in
§ 103 and represents a meaningful contribution to the practice of
patent law.
II. THE ExISTING OBVIOUSNESS RUBRIC
The existing legal framework for analyzing obviousness
represents a decades-long effort to apply an objective test for
patentability under 35 U.S.C. § 103, using the tools articulated by the
Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City.35 This
effort has attempted to avoid hindsight and continues to attempt to
avoid hindsight while determining which inventions are patentable. 3 6
This section of the article describes the Supreme Court's Graham
tools (the "Graham Factors"37) and their place in the existing
obviousness rubric. Issues associated with "negative rules for
invention" 38 in the context of the Graham Factors are discussed.
Then, the authors address requirements for a prima facie case of
obviousness. This section will facilitate the reader's understanding of
the why Lead Prior Art is consistent with the existing obviousness
rubric.
34. See discussion infra Section V.D.
35. Graham v. John Deere Co. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
36. See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007) ("A factfinder should be
aware, of course, of the distortion caused by hindsight bias and must be cautious of arguments
reliant upon ex post reasoning."); see Graham, 383 U.S. at 36 (warning against a "temptation to
read into the prior art the teachings of the invention in issue" and instructing courts to "'guard
against slipping into use of hindsight"') (quoting Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v. Heckethom Mfg.
& Supply Co., 332 F.2d 406, 412 (6th Cir. 1964)).
37. See Siemens Medical Solutions USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc.,
Nos. 2010-1145, 2010-1177, 2011 WL 651790, at *8 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ("Obviousness . . .
requires analysis under the four Graham factors.").
38. See discussion supra Section I and infra Section V.D.
LEAD PRIOR ART METHODOLOGY
A. Graham/KSR
As noted in Section I, infra, when § 103 was added to the Patent
Law in 1952, it was a major development: an objective standard by
which to judge obviousness during a patentability determination.
Prior to 1952, case law described standards of patentability in terms
of "ingenuity" and "genius." For example, in Sinclair & Carroll Co.
v. Interchemical Corp., 39 the Supreme Court noted:
A long line of cases has held it to be an essential requirement for
the validity of a patent that the subject-matter display 'invention',
'more ingenuity * * * than the work of a mechanic skilled in the
art.' . . .This test is often difficult to apply; but its purpose is clear.
Under this test, some substantial innovation is necessary, an
innovation for which society is truly indebted to the efforts of the
patentee.40
And in Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp.:41
[T]he new device, however useful it may be, must reveal the flash
of creative genius not merely the skill of the calling. If it fails, it
has not established its right to a private grant on the public
domain. 42
Similarly, in In re Holt:4 3
It seems to us that appellant, by building his structure in the
manner defined by the appealed claims has made such a useful
improvement in the art, under the circumstances and facts
heretofore stated, that it should not be held that he had done that
only which would be obvious to the skilled mechanic without the
exercise of inventive genius and that he is entitled to a patent as a
regard for his labors ... .44
The Supreme Court first interpreted § 103 in 1966 and set forth a
framework for analyzing obviousness in Graham v. John Deere Co.
of Kansas City.4 5 The Graham framework is consistent with an
objective standard for determining patentability46 and is fundamental
to the existing obviousness rubric. The Graham Court recognized that
39. Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327 (1945).
40. Id. at 330 (emphasis added).
41. Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84 (1941).
42. Id. at 91 (emphasis added).
43. In re Holt, 162 F.2d 472 (C.C.P.A. 1947)(emphasis added).
44. Id. at 477.
45. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
46. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007) ("In Graham . . ., the Court
set out a framework for applying the statutory language of § 103 . . . . The analysis is
objective. . .. ").
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§ 103 was intended to move the standard for patentability from a
subjective "inventive genius" test to an objective test:
It also seems apparent that Congress intended by the last sentence
of § 103 to abolish the test it believed this Court announced in the
controversial phrase "flash of creative genius," used in Cuno[.]47
The Court went on to explain that the obviousness inquiry was a legal
question supported by factual findings:
While the ultimate question of patent validity is one of law, the
§ 103 condition,... lends itself to several basic factual inquiries. 48
Four underlying factual issues were identified, consistent with an
objective standard for determining patentable inventiveness:
Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be
determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at
issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the
pertinent art resolved. Against this background, the obviousness or
nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined. Such
[objective indicia] as commercial success, long felt but unsolved
needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the
circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought
to be patented.49
For the purposes of this article, the Graham Factors will be
identified by number as:
Factor 1: scope and content of the prior art;
Factor 2: differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;
Factor 3: level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and
Factor 4: objective indicia.
In April 2007, the Supreme Court confirmed the Graham Factors
as the proper framework for determining obviousness in KSR:50
In Graham v. John Deere Co. ofKansas City, the Court set out a
framework for applying the statutory language of § 103, language
itself based on the logic of the earlier decision in Hotchkiss v.
Greenwood52 and its progeny.5 The analysis is objective:
47. Graham, 383 U.S. at 15.
48. Id. at 17 (citation omitted).
49. Id. at 17-18.
50. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 406-07.
51. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17-18.
52. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (ll How.) 248 (1850).
53. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 15-17.
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Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be
determined; differences between the prior art and the claims
at issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in
the pertinent art resolved. Against this background, the
obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is
determined. Such secondary considerations as commercial
success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc.,
might be utilized to give light to the circumstances
surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be
patented.54
While the sequence of these questions might be reordered in any
particular case, the factors continue to define the inquiry that controls.
If a court, or patent examiner, conducts this analysis and concludes
the claimed subject matter was obvious, the claim is invalid or
unpatentable under § 103.
1. Application of the Graham Factors
a) Graham Factor 1: Scope and Content of the Prior
Art
In ascertaining Graham Factor 1, the scope and content of the
prior art, one must first determine what constitutes legally-cognizable
56
prior art. In making this initial determination, one considers the
earliest effective date of the publication or patent or the exact date of
any alleged prior knowledge, use or sale to see if it "fits" into one or
more subparagraphs of 35 U.S.C. § 102. Section 102 establishes what
qualifies as prior art for both anticipation and obviousness purposes,
but prior art for § 103 purposes can also be created by the admissions
of the parties. 57
The scope and content of the prior art is important to the Lead
Prior Art methodology because that methodology identifies one or
more starting points and one or more modifications to such starting
points from the prior art. As will be discussed further infra,58
54. Id. at 17-18.
55. KSR, 550 U.S. at 407.
56. See Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
("Before answering Graham's 'content' inquiry, it must be known whether a patent or
publication is in the prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102.").
57. Riverwood Int'l Corp. v. R.A. Jones & Co., Inc., 324 F.3d 1346, 1354 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (citing In re Fout, 675 F.2d 297, 301 (C.C.P.A. 1982)); Tyler Refrigeration v. Kysor
Indus. Corp., 777 F.2d 687, 690 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see In re Nomiya, 509 F.2d 566, 570-71
(C.C.P.A. 1975).
58. See discussion infra Section V.C.
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evaluation of starting points and modifications may allow for a
deduction of nonobviousness or of prima facie obviousness.
Therefore, a determination of the scope and content of the prior art is
fundamental to obviousness analysis, in general, and Lead Prior Art,
specifically.
A POSITA will not likely know about prior art in a different and
unrelated field of technology. Such art, therefore, would not have
rendered an invention obvious.59 But, as explained in In re Clay, a
reference relating to a field of endeavor differing from the inventor's
may still be relevant prior art if "it is one which, because of the matter
with which it deals, logically would have commended itself to an
inventor's attention in considering his problem." 60
If there is relevant prior art, the analysis of its scope and content
(Graham Factor 1) must consider the prior art as a whole; it is not
proper to "pick and choose" or isolate portions of references from the
whole. 6 ' As explained by the Federal Circuit in Panduit:
Among legal standards for determining scope and content of the
prior art, for example, are: a prior patent must be considered in its
entirety, i.e., as a whole, including portions that would lead away
from the invention in suit, W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock,
Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1550, 220 USPQ 303, 311 (Fed.Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 851, 105 S.Ct. 172, 83 L.Ed.2d 107 (1984);
elements of separate prior patents cannot be combined when there
is no suggestion of such combination anywhere in those patents,
ACS Hospital Systems, Inc. v. Montefiore Hospital, 732 F.2d 1572,
1577, 221 USPQ 929, 933 (Fed. Cir. 1984); and a court should
avoid hindsight, W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 721 F.2d at 1553, 220
USPQ at 313.62
The "prior art as a whole" principle corresponds to the statutory
requirement that the claimed invention subject matter is considered
59. In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658-59 (Fed. Cir. 1992). See also In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d
1443, 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re Deminski, 796 F.2d 436, 442 (Fed. Cir. 1986); MANUAL OF
PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE §
2141.01(a) (8th ed. Rev. 8, July 2010) [hereinafter M.P.E.P.].
60. Clay, 966 F.2d at 659 ("A reference is reasonably pertinent if, even though it may be
in a different field from that of the inventor's endeavor, it is one which, because of the matter
with which it deals, logically would have commended itself to an inventor's attention in
considering his problem."); In re ICON Health and Fitness, Inc.,
496 F.3d 1374, 1379-80 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
61. See In re Kudema, 426 F.2d 385, 389 (C.C.P.A. 1970); In re Wesslau, 353 F.2d 238,
241 (C.C.P.A. 1965); Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(quoting Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp., 475 U.S. 809, 810 (1986)).
62. Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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"as a whole."63
An obviousness analysis is, of course, vulnerable to
impermissible hindsight when a factfinder has knowledge of an
inventor's solution.64 Hindsight in the context of Graham Factor 1
means using the inventor's disclosure to determine the scope and
content of the prior art, rather than objectively determining what a
POSITA, at the time of the invention, would consider the specific
scope and content of the prior art for further innovation. Using Lead
Prior Art when assessing the scope and content of the prior art
(Graham Factor 1) helps the factfinder avoid hindsight because it
ensures that the factfinder is objectively determining the correct scope
and content of the prior art: that which a POSITA would have
considered the most "sensible starting point(s)" in the context of
whatever problem the POSITA faced at the time of the invention.
b) Graham Factor 2: Diferences Between the Prior
Art and the Claimed Invention
The requirement to consider the prior art "as a whole" leads
logically to Graham Factor 2: differences between the prior art and
the claims at issue.65 Once the scope and content of the prior art is
known, a comparison between that prior art and the claimed invention
is appropriate to determine any differences. Analysis of Graham
Factor 2 involves construing the claims at issue and comparing them
to the prior art.66 As noted above, comparison of the construed claims
is performed relative to the prior art as a whole, because "[i]t is
63. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 103(a); Jones v. Hardy, 727 F.2d 1524, 1530, (Fed. Cit. 1984)
(treating an unclaimed advantage as the gist of the patented invention "disregards the statutory
requirement that the invention be viewed 'as a whole', ignores the problem-recognition element,
and injects an improper 'obvious to try' consideration"); Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 357 F.3d
1270, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("The 'as a whole' instruction in title 35 prevents evaluation of the
invention part by part. . .. This form of hindsight reasoning, using the invention as a roadmap to
find its prior art components, would discount the value of combining various existing features or
principles in a new way to achieve a new result-often the very definition of invention.").
64. See discussion infra Section II.C; see also In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1075 (Fed. Cir.
1988) ("One cannot use hindsight reconstruction to pick and choose among isolated disclosures
in the prior art to deprecate the claimed invention."); W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock,
Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("To imbue one of ordinary skill in the art with
knowledge of the invention in suit, when no prior art reference or references of record convey or
suggest that knowledge, is to fall victim to the insidious effect of a hindsight syndrome wherein
that which only the inventor taught is used against its teacher. . . . [T~he decisionmaker [must)
cast the mind back to the time the invention was made (often as here many years), to occupy the
mind of one skilled in the art who is presented only with the references, and who is normally
guided by the then-accepted wisdom in the art.").
65. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
66. See Panduit, 810 F.2d at 1566-68.
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impermissible within the framework of section 103 to pick and
choose from any one reference only so much of it as will support a
given position, to the exclusion of other parts necessary to the full
appreciation of what such reference fairly suggests to one of ordinary
skill in the art."67
Graham Factor 2 is another component of obviousness analysis
where hindsight may arise due to a temptation to use the claimed
invention as the roadmap through the prior art, seeing signposts and
similarities that are only visible because of the disclosure.6 8 The
Federal Circuit explained in Princeton Biochemicals, Inc. v. Coulter,
Inc.:
As this court outlined in Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 357 F.3d 1270,
1275 (Fed. Cir. 2004), in making the assessment of differences
between the prior art and the claimed subject matter, section 103
specifically requires consideration of the claimed invention "as a
whole." . . . The "as a whole" instruction in title 35 prevents
evaluation of the invention part by part.... Without this important
requirement, an obviousness assessment might successfully break
an invention into its component parts, then find a prior art
reference corresponding to each component.... This line of
reasoning would import hindsight into the obviousness
determination by using the invention as a roadmap to find its prior
art components. Further, this improper method would discount the
value of combining various existing features or principles in a new
way to achieve a new result-often the essence of invention. 69
An objective assessment of the differences between the prior art and
the claimed invention (Graham Factor 2), including all properties and
67. In re Wesslau, 353 F.2d 238, 241 (C.C.P.A. 1965); see also Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v.
Barnes-Hind/Hydrocurve, Inc., 796 F.2d 443, 448-49 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that the district
court, by failing to consider a prior art reference in its entirety, ignored portions of the reference
that led away from obviousness); In re Boe, 355 F.2d 961, 965 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (all of the
disclosures in a reference, including non-preferred embodiments, "must be evaluated for what
they fairly teach one of ordinary skill in the art"); Merck & Co. v. Biocraft Labs., Inc., 874 F.2d
804, 807 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("the fact that a specific [embodiment] is taught to be preferred is not
controlling, since all disclosures of the prior art, including unpreferred embodiments, must be
considered") (quoting In re Lamberti, 545 F.2d 747, 750 (C.C.P.A. 1976)).
68. See Fine, 837 F.2d at 1075 ("One cannot use hindsight reconstruction to pick and
choose among isolated disclosures in the prior art to deprecate the claimed invention."); see also
discussion infra Section II.C.
69. Princeton Biochemicals, Inc. v. Beckman Coulter, Inc., 411 F.3d 1332, 1337 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted). See also Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 357 F.3d 1270, 1275
(Fed. Cir. 2004) ("The 'as a whole' instruction in title 35 prevents evaluation of the invention
part by part. . . . This form of hindsight reasoning, using the invention as a roadmap to find its
prior art components, would discount the value of combining various existing features or
principles in a new way to achieve a new result-often the very definition of invention.").
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in the context of whatever problem the POSITA faced at the time of
the invention, will shed light on what a POSITA would have
considered the most sensible starting point(s) in the prior art.
Lead Prior Art relies on an awareness of the differences between
the prior art and the claimed invention as a whole to direct objective
analysis toward those elements of the claimed invention that are not
present in a particular Lead Prior Art starting point, as discussed
infra. 7 0 By recognizing the differences between the Lead Prior Art
starting point and the claimed invention, this analysis can determine
whether teachings or suggestions in the prior art, or application of
common sense and ordinary creativity would allow for modifying the
starting point prior art to achieve the claimed invention. If so, a
starting point prior art can be modified in pursuit of achieving the
claimed invention." Accordingly, the differences between the prior
art and the claimed invention as a whole are very influential to the
obviousness analysis in general and Lead Prior Art specifically.
c) Graham Factor 3: Level of Ordinary Skill in the
Art
Determining "[t]he level of ordinary skill in the art" is required
by Graham Factor 3.72 The actual inventor's skill is irrelevant
because the inventor does not necessarily represent a worker of
ordinary skill. 7 3 By focusing on the level of skill of the POSITA
rather than the actual inventor in the determination of Graham Factor
3, a factfinder maintains an objective perspective and avoids
hindsight.74
A POSITA represents a hypothetical person presumed to be
aware of all pertinent prior art in the area of the invention. A
70. See discussion infra Section IV.
71. See discussion infra Section V.
72. See In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
73. See Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Barnes-Hind/Hydrocurve, Inc., 796 F.2d 443, 448 (Fed.
Cir. 1986) (citing Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 454 (Fed. Cir. 1985));
Stewart-Warner Corp. v. City of Pontiac, 767 F.2d 1563, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Environmental.
Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 713 F.2d 693, 697 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (evaluating
obviousness requires ascertaining what would have been obvious to the ordinary skilled person,
not to the inventor, judge, layman, those skilled in remote arts, or geniuses in the art at hand).
74. See discussion infra Section II.C.
75. In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("Obviousness is determined
from the vantage point of a hypothetical person having ordinary skill in the art to which the
patent pertains. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). . . . The legal construct also presumes that all prior art
references in the field of the invention are available to this hypothetical skilled artisan. See In re
Carlson, 983 F.2d 1032, 1038, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d 1207, 1211 (Fed. Cir. 1993).").
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POSITA also possesses ordinary creativity and exercises common
sense when analyzing the available knowledge in the art.76
A dispute over Graham Factor 3 may arise in the context of a
dispute over the relevant scope and content of the prior art (Graham
Factor 1). The Federal Circuit faced an example of this in Dystar:"
"[T]he parties disagree over the relevance of the cited prior art, which,
fundamentally, is a disagreement over the level of ordinary skill in the
art . ... " Finding a higher "level of ordinary skill in the art," may
mean a broader "scope and content of prior art." 79 The "level of skill
in the art" may also assist the factfinder in an obviousness analysis if
the issue is whether the claimed invention was "obvious to try,"80
particularly in the context of optimizing parameters.
One of the most important contributions of Graham Factor 3 to
the obviousness analysis is to remind the factfinder of the requirement
to evaluate obviousness from the objective perspective of a POSITA
who would have been working in the art at the time the invention was
made.8 2 As explained by the Federal Circuit in Al-Site Corp. v. VSI
Intern., Inc.: 83
In the first place, the level of skill in the art is a prism or lens
through which a judge or jury views the prior art and the claimed
invention. This reference point prevents these deciders from using
76. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007); W. Union Co. v.
MoneyGram Payment Sys, Inc., 626 F.3d 1361, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
77. DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d
1356 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
78. Id at 1361-62; see also Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d
158, 163-64 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
79. See Innovention Toys, LLC v. MGA Entertainment, Inc., No. 2010-1290, 2011 WL
941563, at *8 (Fed. Cir. 2011). ("A less sophisticated level of skill generally favors a
determination of nonobviousness, and thus the patentee, while a higher level of skill favors the
reverse.").
80. See discussion infra Section II.A.2.
81. See, e.g., Ecolab, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 569 F.3d 1335, 1350 (Fed Cir. 2009) ("Ecolab's
expert admitted that one skilled in the art would know how to adjust application parameters to
determine the optimum parameters for a particular solution. The question then is whether it
would have been obvious to combine the high pressure parameter disclosed in the Bender patent
with the PAA methods disclosed in FMC's '676 patent. The answer is yes."); see also
Examination Guidelines Update: Developments in the Obviousness Inquiry After KSR v.
Teleflex, 75 Fed. Reg. 53,643. 53,648 (Sept. 1, 2010) [hereinafter 2010 KSR Guidelines
Update] ("If optimization of the application parameters had not been within the level of ordinary
skill in the art, the outcome of the Ecolab case may well have been different.").
82. See Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Nu-Star Inc., 950 F.2d 714, 718 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("The
importance of resolving the level of ordinary skill in the art lies in the necessity of maintaining
objectivity in the obviousness inquiry.").
83. Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int'l., Inc., 174 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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their own insight or, worse yet, hindsight, to gauge
obviousness. ... Skill in the art does not act as a bridge over gaps
in substantive presentation of an obviousness case, but instead
supplies the primary guarantee of objectivity in the process.84
With the objective information provided by Graham Factor 3 ("level
of skill" of POSITA), the factfinder can proceed with the
determination of whether the claimed subject matter would have been
obvious to a POSITA at the time of the invention.
d) Graham Factor 4: Objective Indicia
In Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City,85 the Supreme
Court instructed that "secondary considerations," such as
"commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others,
etc., . . . may have relevancy."; 86 i.e., objective factors that may show
that an invention was not obvious from the prior art. Post-Graham
case law filled in "etc." with other "objective indicia": copying,
licensing activity, teaching away, and unexpected results." The
Courts often refer to Graham Factor 4 "secondary considerations" as
"objective indicia of nonobviousness."" Similarly, this article will
use the term "objective indicia of nonobviousness." Analysis of
objective indicia applies in both ex parte patent examination" and
inter partes patent litigation.90
84. Id. at 1324.
85. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
86. Id. at 17-18; see also KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007).
87. See Arkie Lures, Inc. v. Gene Larew Tackle, Inc., 119 F.3d 953, 957 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
("In this case the considerations of commercial success, licensing activity, and copying were
markedly prevalent, and were not disputed. Such aspects may be highly probative of the issue of
nonobviousness."); Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ("Wyers
presented evidence of secondary indicia of nonobviousness, including commercial success,
copying, and unexpected results.").
88. See Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1338-39 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
("These underlying factual findings . . . include the familiar Graham factors: the scope and
content of the prior art, the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue, the level of
ordinary skill in the pertinent art, and secondary considerations, otherwise known as objective
indicia of nonobviousness.") (citing Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17-
18 (1966).); Ecolab Inc. v. FMC Corp., 569 F.3d 1335, 1349 (Fed Cir. 2009).
89. See Richardson-Vicks Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 122 F.3d 1476, 1483 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
("Rather than permit a court to ignore evidence of unexpected results, In re Soni makes clear
that such evidence must be considered in evaluating the obviousness of a claimed invention. In
arriving at its judgment regarding whether the claimed invention would have been obvious, the
trial court should have given appropriate weight to the evidence of unexpected results. ... This
proposition holds not only in ex parte proceedings before the PTO but also in inter partes
proceedings in the district courts." (internal citation omitted)).
90. See Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("It is
jurisprudentially inappropriate to disregard any relevant evidence on any issue in any case,
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Objective indicia evidence may be submitted to rebut a prima
facie case of obviousness,9 1 and it may also have relevance in the
determination of whether a prima facie case of obviousness has been
established. 9 2 The prima facie case of obviousness is discussed in
detail in Section ILB, infra. Objective indicia of nonobviousness
provide an objective indication of economic and motivational issues
and enlighten whether the POSITA would have started with the
allegedly invalidating prior art and modified it in such a way as to
have arrived at the claimed invention.93
Federal Circuit case law has recognized the importance of
objective indicia as a check on impermissible hindsight: 94
In determining the question of obviousness, inquiry should always
be made into whatever objective evidence of nonobviousness there
may be. Connell v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1549,
220 U.S.P.Q. 193, 199 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The so-called "secondary
considerations" can often prevent a court from slipping into an
impermissible hindsight analysis. They should be considered as a
fourth factual inquiry under Graham before coming to a
conclusion concerning obviousness.95
Claimed inventions that may have been obvious through hindsight
bias might not truly be obvious under an unbiased evaluation.
Objective indicia reduces impermissible hindsight and provides
indirect evidence of the nonobviousness of the claimed invention.
Hindsight will be explored in detail in Section II. C, infra.
According to the Federal Circuit in Geo M Martin Co. v.
Alliance Machine Systems Intern. LLC, 96 Graham Factor 4 must be
addressed if the evidence is of record:
Secondary considerations of non-obviousness must be considered
when present. Sud-Chemie, Inc. v. Multisorb Techs., Inc., 554 F.3d
1001, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2009). As the Supreme Court recently
patent cases included. Thus evidence rising out of the so-called "secondary considerations" must
always when present be considered en route to a determination of obviousness. (citations
omitted)").
91. See Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 464 F.3d 1286, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ("After
making these factual determinations, it concluded that Mylan had established a strong prima
facie case of obviousness, which Alza had failed to rebut through secondary considerations.").
92. See discussion infra Section II.B.
93. See discussion infra Section III.
94. See discussion infra Section II.C.
95. Vandenberg v. Dairy Equip. Co., 740 F.2d 1560, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (first
emphasis added) (citation omitted) (citing Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542,
1549 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Stratoflex, 713 F.2d at 1538).
96. Geo M. Martin Co. v. Alliance Mach. Sys. Int'l LLC, 618 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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reaffirmed, "'[s]uch secondary considerations as commercial
success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might
be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin
of the subject matter sought to be patented."' KSR, 550 U.S. at
406, 127 S.Ct. 1727 (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co. ofKansas
City, 383 U.S. 1, 17-18, 86 S.Ct. 684, 15 L.Ed.2d 545 (1966)).97
Objective indicia may show that the allegedly invalidating prior art
was not suggested by the prior art and the general level of knowledge
in the field. If that is the case, then that prior art would not have been
a "sensible starting point" for a POSITA and would not have been
part of the Lead Prior Art. 98
With any type of objective indicia evidence, an
applicant/patentee bears the burden of establishing a nexus between
the merits of the claimed invention and the evidence. 99 Specifically,
that means the applicant/patentee must show that the objective indicia
evidence is the result of the inventive aspect of the claimed subject
matter. 100 For example, commercial success resulting from an
advertising campaign or packaging does not have a sufficient nexus to
the invention to rebut a prima facie case of obviousness.o'0 In
Hearing Components, Inc. v. Shure Inc.,' 0 2 the Federal Circuit found
a sufficient nexus between the evidence of commercial success and
the inventive aspect of the invention. The evidence showed that "the
licensing fee for a covered product was more than cut in half
97. Id. at 1304; see also TriMed, Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 608 F.3d 1333, 1343 (Fed. Cir.
2010) ("We have repeatedly held that evidence of secondary considerations must be considered
if present. . . . 'Our precedents clearly hold that secondary considerations, when present, must be
considered in determining obviousness."') (quoting Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 667
(Fed. Cir. 2000)).
98. See discussion infra Section IV.
99. See In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 140 (Fed. Cir. 1996); In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573,
1580 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("For objective evidence to be accorded substantial weight, its proponent
must establish a nexus between the evidence and the merits of the claimed invention."); Wyers
v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ("Our case law clearly establishes
that the patentee must establish a nexus between the evidence of commercial success and the
patented invention.").
100. See W. Union Co. v. MoneyGram Payment Sys., Inc., 626 F.3d 1361, 1373 (Fed. Cir.
2010) ("Here, Western Union failed to present any relevant evidence proving a nexus between
its commercial success and its claimed invention. . . . It cannot therefore claim any commercial
success that arose from features of the system found in the prior art as a consideration for
nonobviousness of its claimed invention.").
101. See McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. L. Perrigo Co., 337 F.3d 1362, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("The
court found that McNeil had launched a massive marketing and advertising campaign in
connection with the launch of the Imodium® Advanced product, obscuring any nexus that might
have existed between the merits of the product and its commercial success.").
102. Hearing Components, Inc. v. Shure Inc., 600 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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immediately upon the expiration of the ... patent, supporting its
contention that the success of the device was related to the patent." 0 3
"Unexpected results" are often characterized in the case law as
an "objective indicia" for rebutting the prima facie cases of
obviousness, even though it is not listed in Graham.'04 Unexpected
results are evidence that a POSITA would not have expected success
from the modification to the prior art, and was therefore unlikely to
make that modification. 105
Unexpected results may be disclosed in the specification, or may
involve testing to show that the claimed invention possesses
"unexpectedly improved properties or properties that the prior art
does not have,"' 06 or that "a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art
would have found surprising or unexpected." 0 7
"Teaching away" is considered objective indicia evidence that
will rebut a prima facie case of obviousness. 08 A reference "teaches
away" from the claimed invention when a POSITA, upon reading the
reference, may have been led in a direction divergent from the path
that was taken by the applicant.' 09 In DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic
Sofamor Danek,"0 the Federal Circuit explained that a reference
teaches away if it shows that a proposed modification would not work
103. Id. at 1374-75.
104. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966) ("Such
secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others,
etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject
matter sought to be patented."); In re Glatt, 630 F.3d 1026, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ("In addition
to traversing the examiner's obviousness rejection, Glatt offered various types of secondary
considerations evidence, including evidence of unexpected results, long-felt need, and
commercial success due to the improvement, to rebut the examiner's prima facie case."); Daiichi
Sankyo Co. v. Matrix Labs., Ltd., 619 F.3d 1346, 1351-52 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ("Finally, the district
court concluded that even if Mylan had established a prima facie case of obviousness, secondary
considerations counseled against a finding of obviousness. Specifically, the court found
evidence of unexpected results in olmesartan medoxomil's enhanced potency and other
favorable biological properties.") (citations omitted).
105. See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 989, 994
(Fed. Cir. 2009).
106. Id. at 997 (quoting In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 692-93 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
107. Id. at 994 (quoting In re Soni, 54 F.3d 746, 750 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
108. See In re Peterson, 315 F.3d 1325, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("[Aln applicant may rebut
a prima facie case of obviousness by showing that the prior art teaches away from the claimed
invention in any material respect.").
109. Baxter Int'l., Inc. v. McGaw, Inc., 149 F.3d 1321, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("'[1]n
general, a reference will teach away if it suggests that the line of development flowing from the
reference's disclosure is unlikely to be productive of the result sought by the applicant.")
(quoting In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d 1130, 1131 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
110. DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
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for the intended purpose:
[t]he opposite conclusion would follow, however, if the prior art
indicated that the invention would not have worked for its intended
purpose or otherwise taught away from the invention. See United
States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 52, 86 S.Ct. 708, 15 L.Ed.2d 572
(1966) (upholding nonobviousness where references teaching away
from the claimed combination would "deter any investigation into
such a combination"); In re ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d
1374, 1382 (Fed.Cir.2007) ("[A] reference teaches away from a
combination when using it in that combination would produce an
inoperative result."). An inference of nonobviousness is especially
strong where the prior art's teachings undermine the very reason
being proffered as to why a person of ordinary skill would have
combined the known elements.11
Another form of "teaching away" is when some teachings of the
prior art conflict with other parts of the same reference or another
reference. 112 Since the prior art must be evaluated "as a whole," 1 3
everything in the prior art must be considered. "Teaching away"
evidence reflects the assumption that a POSITA, at the time of the
invention, evaluates all the pros and cons of the prior art teachings. In
terms of Lead Prior Art, this evaluation would determine a "sensible
starting point." Sufficient conflict in the prior art may be considered a
teaching away because a POSITA would have no reason to expect
success from combining or modifying the references. As noted by the
Federal Circuit in DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek,
Inc.,ll 4 "[a]n inference [that a claimed combination would not have
been obvious] is especially strong where the prior art's teachings
undermine the very reason being proffered as to why a person of
ordinary skill would have combined the known elements."" 5
A POSITA at the time of the invention would not have
considered a prior art reference that taught away to be a "sensible
starting point" for developing the claimed subject matter. Instead, the
POSITA would have been led in a different direction by the teachings
11l. Id. at 1326.
112. See Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ("Where
the prior art contains 'apparently conflicting' teachings (i.e., where some references teach the
combination and others teach away from it) each reference must be considered 'for its power to
suggest solutions to an artisan of ordinary skill. . . . consider[ing] the degree to which one
reference might accurately discredit another."' ) (quoting In re Young, 927 F.2d 588, 591 (Fed.
Cir. 1991)).
113. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 103(a).
114. DePuy Spine, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314.
115. Id. at 1326.
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of the prior art.
2. "Negative Rules to Invention"
Various "negative rules to invention" related to the obviousness
inquiry have developed in the case law.' 6 Some, such as "obvious to
try," and "known elements achieving predictable results" are
discussed in detail, infra.'1 7 The danger presented by "negative rules
to invention" is that the factfinder pigeonholes the specific
circumstances as one of the "negatives to invention" rather than
conducting a full, fact-specific inquiry, as mandated by the Supreme
Court in Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City" 8 and Federal
Circuit precedent.1 9 Such labeling is also contrary to the explicit
instructions from the USPTO to the examiners:
The key to supporting any rejection under 35 U.S.C. 103 is the
clear articulation of the reason(s) why the claimed invention would
have been obvious. The Supreme Court in KSR noted that the
analysis supporting a rejection under 35 U.S.C. 103 should be
made explicit. The Court quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988,
78 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1329, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006), stated that
"'[R]ejections on obviousness cannot be sustained by mere
conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated
reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal
conclusion of obviousness."'
1 20
The Supreme Court described "obvious to try" in KSR as:
When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem
and there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a
person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known
options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads to the
anticipated success, it is likely the product not of innovation but of
ordinary skill and common sense. In that instance the fact that a
combination was obvious to try might show that it was obvious
under § 103.121
The USPTO 2010 Guidelinesl22 discuss the appropriate use of
"obvious to try" in detail:
116. See CHISUM, supra note 10, at § 5.04[5][a].
117. See infra notes 118 and 121.
118. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966).
119. See Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 550 F.3d 1075, 1089 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("The
determination of obviousness is dependent on the facts of each case.").
120. M.P.E.P., supra note 59, at § 2141.
121. KSR Int'1 Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007).
122. 2010 KSR Guidelines Update, supra note 81, at 53,643.
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[T]his rationale is only appropriate when there is a recognized
problem or need in the art; there are a finite number of identified,
predictable solutions to the recognized need or problem; and one of
ordinary skill in the art could have pursued these known potential
solutions with a reasonable expectation of success.123
"Known elements achieving predictable results" represents another
example of a "negative rule to invention." 2 4 Such subject matter
would normally be considered obvious.' 25 In Agrizap, Inc. v.
Woodstream Corp.,12 6 for example, the court concluded that the only
difference between the claimed device and the prior art device was an
electrical switch rather than a mechanical switch.12 7 In addition, using
an "animal body as a resistive switch to complete a circuit for the
generation of an electric charge was already well known in the prior
art."1 2 8 The Federal Circuit concluded that the facts in Agrizap
presented a strong case of obviousness, and, in fact, "a textbook case
of when the asserted claims involve a combination of familiar
elements according to known methods that does no more than yield
predictable results."1 29
Ecolab, Inc. v. FMC Corp.130 provides another case law example
of the "negative to invention," "known elements achieving
predictable results." In Ecolab, the Federal Circuit found the claimed
subject matter obvious in light of known prior art elements, a reason
to combine these known prior art elements, and the technical ability to
dS.131do so.
Rather than justifying a superficial pronouncement, this article
advocates for a fact-specific inquiry into obviousness, in the context
of the subject matter in question, "including the characteristics of the
science or technology, its state of advance, the nature of the known
choices, the specificity or generality of the prior art, and the
predictability of results in the area of interest." 32 By relying on labels
rather than articulated analysis, the obviousness inquiry gets short-
123. Id. at 53,653.
124. See CHISUM, supra note 10, at § 5.04[5][c].
125. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 103(a).
126. Agrizap, Inc. v. Woodstream Corp., 520 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
127. See id. at 1344.
128. Id.
129. Id.; see also 2010 KSR Guidelines Update, supra note 81, at 53,650 (Agrizap is
included in the 2010 Guidelines as an example of Rationale B: "Substituting One Known
Element for Another.").
130. Ecolab, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 569 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
131. Id. at 1350.
132. Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2008):
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circuited. A fact-specific inquiry is required to correctly conclude the
obviousness or nonobviousness of the invention at issue.' 33
Lead Prior Art neutralizes "negative rules to invention" within
the existing obviousness rubric by objectively determining the
Graham factors and consequently objectively determining whether a
POSITA, at the time of the invention, would have considered the
invention obvious.13 4
B. The Prima Facie Case of Obviousness
1. The Dance Steps and the Burdens
The summum bonum of our Lead Prior Art methodology is to
reduce subjectivity in determining whether a prima facie case of
obviousness exists or not. We will now thoroughly explore the
concept of prima facie case:
"A prima facie case of obviousness is established when the
teachings from the prior art itself would appear to have suggested
the claimed subject matter to a person of ordinary skill in the
art." . . . If the examiner fails to establish a prima facie case, the
rejection is improper and will be overturned. 1
The legal issue of whether a given subject matter would have
been obvious, and thus unpatentable, is first determined during patent
prosecution. In that context, the prima facie case of obviousness has
been explained by the Federal Circuit:
"[as] a procedural tool of patent examination, allocating the
burdens of going forward as between examiner and applicant....
As discussed in In re Piasecki [. . .], the examiner bears the initial
burden, on review of the prior art or on any other ground, of
presenting a prima facie case of unpatentability. If that burden is
met, the burden of coming forward with evidence or arguments
shifts to the applicant." 36
133. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 103(a); see also Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 550 F.3d 1075,
1089 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("The determination of obviousness is dependent on the facts of each
case.").
134. See discussion infra Section V.D.
135. In re Rijckaert, 9 F.3d 1531, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (quoting In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781,
782 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
136. In re Soni, 54 F.3d 746, 752-53 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Michel, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added) (quoting In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). As will be discussed
further infra, an equivalent two step process of burden allocation from challenger (first) to
patentee (second) takes place once the patent issues, although the standard of proof for
ultimately proving obviousness changes from "preponderance of the evidence" during
prosecution to "clear and convincing evidence" during litigation.
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Thus, establishment of a prima facie case of obviousness shifts
the burden of production of evidence from the examiner to the
applicant. In contrast, although no specific statute provides for burden
allocation during patent prosecution, courts have held that the burden
of persuasion on the issue of obviousness remains with the Office. As
explained in In re Oetiker:
Specifically, when obviousness is at issue, the examiner has the
burden of persuasion and therefore the initial burden of production.
Satisfying the burden of production, and thus initially the burden
of persuasion, constitutes the so-called prima facie showing. Once
that burden is met, the applicant has the burden of production to
demonstrate that the examiner's preliminary determination is not
correct. The examiner, and if later involved, the Board, retain the
ultimate burden ofpersuasion on the issue.137
After a given patent application matures into an issued patent
claim, 35 U.S.C. § 282 mandates that "[the] patent shall be presumed
valid.... [And] [t]he burden of establishing invalidity of [the] patent
or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such
invalidity."' 38 Consequently, the Federal Circuit has applied the same
procedural "prima facie case" mechanism to patent validity/invalidity
rulings. The standard of proof is elevated from "preponderance of the
evidence" during prosecution, to "clear and convincing evidence"
during litigation. 139 The Federal Circuit has applied that elevated
standard regardless of what prior art was specifically considered
during patent prosecution.14 0 But, the Supreme Court is currently
scheduled to rule on whether the court should differentiate and afford
less deference to the validity of a patent when "the prior art on which
the invalidity defense rests was not considered by the Patent and
Trademark Office prior to the issuance of the asserted patent."'41
137. In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (emphasis added).
138. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2002).
139. See Schumer v. Lab. Computer Sys., Inc., 308 F.3d 1304, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
140. See Gillette Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 919 F.2d 720, 722-23 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
("The claims of Monson are entitled to a presumption of validity and Gillette faces the burden of
showing, by clear and convincing evidence, their invalidity.... This burden is not lessened by
Gillette's introduction at trial of prior art not before the PTO during prosecution.") (internal
citation omitted).
141. See i4i Ltd. Partnership v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert.
granted, 131 S.Ct. 647 (2010); Petition for Writ of Certioari, Microsoft Corp., 131 S.Ct. 647
(No. 10-290).
QUESTION PRESENTED: The Patent Act provides that "[a] patent shall be
presumed valid" and that "[t]he burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or
any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity." 35 U.S.C. §
282. The Federal Circuit held below that Microsoft was required to prove its
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Nevertheless, aside from the question on the appropriate level of
deference afforded by the Court, the law remains that the burden of
persuasion "is constant and remains throughout the suit on the
challenger" and "does not shift at any time to the patent owner."l 4 2
The significance of a prima facie case of obviousness is central
the Lead Prior Art methodology. That methodology seeks to force a
conscientious, forward-looking analysis of the prior art and
suggestions therein to determine whether appropriate starting point(s)
and one or more modifications would allow for arriving at the
claimed invention. If so, the claimed invention may be prima facie
obvious subject to other considerations discussed infra.143  Thus,
understanding the strategic and technical issues surrounding prima
facie obviousness is important to understanding Lead Prior Art.
2. Challenging the Prima Facie Case
The examiner's burden is to establish obviousness under the law,
as the law is set forth in 35 USC § 103, and by applying "the
controlling inquiry" outlined in Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas
City.144 Consequently, once the Office asserts its alleged prima face
case of obviousness, applicants can consider replying with a two-part
argument: an attack and, if the attack fails, a rebuttal. Indeed, "[o]nce
Office personnel have established the Graham factual findings and
defense of invalidity under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) by "clear and convincing
evidence," even though the prior art on which the invalidity defense rests was not
considered by the Patent and Trademark Office prior to the issuance of the
asserted patent. The question presented is: Whether the court of appeals erred in
holding that Microsoft's invalidity defense must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence.
Id.
142. See TP Labs., Inc. v. Prof'I Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 971 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
143. See discussion infra Section V.C.
144. See discussion supra Section IIA; In re Rijckaert, 9 F.3d 1531, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
("In rejecting claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103, the examiner bears the initial burden of presenting
a prima facie case of obviousness. Only if that burden is met, does the burden of coming
forward with evidence or argument shift to the applicant.") (citations omitted); KSR Int'l Co. v.
Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406-07 (2007) ("Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City ... set
out a framework for applying the statutory language of § 103. . . . While the sequence of these
questions might be reordered in any particular case, the factors continue to define the inquiry
that controls.") (emphasis added). In general, 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) states:
A prima facie case of unpatentability is established when the information
compels a conclusion that a claim is unpatentable under the preponderance of
evidence, burden-of-proof standard, giving each term in the claim its broadest
reasonable construction consistent with the specification, and before any
consideration is given to evidence which may be submitted in an attempt to
establish a contrary conclusion of patentability.
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concluded that the claimed invention would have been obvious, the
burden then shifts to the applicant to:
(A) show that the Office erred in these findings, or
(B) provide other evidence to show that the claimed subject matter
would have been nonobvious."l 45
To be sure, Option (A) provides an opportunity for "attacking" the
existence of a prima facie case of obviousness and option (B)
provides an opportunity and need for coming forward with
"rebutting" evidence overcoming an established prima facie case (i.e.,
evidence that, even if the examiner raised a prima facie case, the
invention might have been, nevertheless, non-obvious in face of the
additional evidence).14 6
Thus, applicants have the opportunity to challenge every
Graham factual finding, including the initial prima facie
determination by the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO"). That is,
applicants can challenge the PTO's determination of the scope and
content of the prior art and its selection of a subset of that prior art for
its prima facie case (Graham Factors 1 and 2). Failure to challenge
that choice could undermine the applicants' case, at least because
applicants are required to "distinctly and specifically point out the
supposed errors in the Office's action and reply to every ground of
objection and rejection in the Office action."l 4 7
As discussed above, examiners are required to consider all
evidence, including "secondary considerations," at all stages of the
obviousness determination.14 8 To be sure, "any initial obviousness
determination"l 4 9  and "all rejections of record and proposed
rejections should be reviewed to confirm their continued viability."15 0
145. M.P.E.P., supra note 59, at § 2141.
146. See In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("The patent applicant may
then attack the Examiner's prima facie determination as improperly made out, or the applicant
may present objective evidence tending to support a conclusion of nonobviousness.").
147. M.P.E.P., supra note 59, at § 2141 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 1.111(b)).
148. See 2010 KSR Guidelines Update, supra note 81, at 53,643, 54,657 ("Once the
applicant has presented rebuttal evidence, Office personnel should reconsider any initial
obviousness determination in view of the entire record. See, e.g., In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468,
1472, 223 U.S.P.Q. 785, 788 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Eli Lilly & Co., 90 F.2d 943, 945 (Fed. Cir.
1990). All the rejections of record and proposed rejections and their bases should be reviewed to
confirm their continued viability.") (citing M.P.E.P., supra note 59, at § 2141); id. ("Example
5.2; In re Sullivan, 498 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Teaching point: All evidence, including
evidence rebutting a prima facie case of obviousness, must be considered when properly
presented").
149. M.P.E.P., supra note 59, at § 2141 V.
150. Id.
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Indeed, the USPTO's 2010 Guidelines on obviousness explicitly
remind examiners that "[a]s reflected in the MPEP, such evidence
should not be considered simply for its 'knockdown' value; rather, all
evidence must be reweighed to determine whether the claims are
nonobvious."15' The Director's statement that the "evidence must be
reweighed" must refer to weighing evidence against evidence, not to
weighing evidence against a previous conclusion or a presumption
(such as the prima facie case).15 2 Nonetheless, the Office still has the
burden to show that, under a preponderance of the evidence standard,
the evidence supporting the existence of a prima facie case of
obviousness outweighs the evidence against it. 153 Otherwise, there
cannot be a prima facie case of obviousness. 1 5 4 Consequently, as the
Federal Circuit stated in In re Piasecki:
After a prima facie case of obviousness has been established, the
burden of going forward shifts to the applicant. Rebuttal is merely
"a showing of facts supporting the opposite conclusion", [sic] ...
and may relate to any of the Graham factors including the so-
called secondary considerations.... If rebuttal evidence of
adequate weight is produced, the holding of prima facie
obviousness, being but a legal inference from previously
uncontradicted evidence, is dissipated. Regardless of whether the
prima facie case could have been characterized as strong or weak,
the examiner must consider all of the evidence anew.155
Once the Office has established a prima facie case of
obviousness, the "burden shifts to the applicant to come forward with
151. 2010 KSR Guidelines Update, supra note 81, at 54,657 (quoting M.P.E.P., supra note
59, at § 2145).
152. In re Eli Lilly & Co., 902 F.2d 943 945 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("After a primafacie case of
obviousness has been made and rebuttal evidence submitted, all the evidence must be
considered anew. In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1984) states:
When prima facie obviousness is established and evidence is submitted in
rebuttal, the decision-maker must start over. . . . An earlier decision should not,
as it was here, be considered as set in concrete, and applicant's rebuttal evidence
then be evaluated only on its knockdown ability.... Facts established by rebuttal
evidence must be evaluated along with the facts on which the earlier conclusion
was reached, not against the conclusion itself.)
(quoting In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d at 1472).
153. See Eli Lilly, 902 F.2d at 948; In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445, 1446 (Fed. Cir.
1992) ("After evidence or argument is submitted by the applicant in response, patentability is
determined on the totality of the record, by a preponderance of evidence with due consideration
to persuasiveness of argument.") ("the term 'prima facie obvious' relates to the burden on the
examiner at the initial stage of the examination, while the conclusion of obviousness vel non is
based on the preponderance of evidence and argument in the record.").
154. See Oetiker, 977 F.2d at 1447.
155. In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (emphasis added).
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arguments and/or evidence to rebut the prima facie case."' 5 6 The case
law shows that successfully overcoming an established prima facie
case of obviousness requires certain types of evidence, or at least
evidence that meets certain thresholds or limitations. 157  More
specifically, for example, the rebuttal evidence takes the form of
objective indicia of nonobviousness, which includes the type of
evidence discussed in Graham Factor 4. 15 The evidence can,159 but
need not be in the application "as filed," because affidavits and
declarations by an inventor or an expert opinion as to what a POSITA
would have done under the circumstance can be introduced during
prosecution.160 To be sure, one challenging the validity of an issued
patent has the burden of proof with respect to all of the Graham
Factors, including objective evidence of nonobviousness.' 6 1
Accordingly, the Court has held that:
[i]n the instant case, the patent has been granted. [The patentee]
does not have any burden of proving superior results. The burden
is on [the patent challenger] to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the invention does not produce su erior results; [the
patent challenger] has failed to meet that burden.
Cases have held that rebuttal evidence must also be
"commensurate in scope" with the claims.163 But an applicant or
156. M.P.E.P., supra note 59, at § 2145 (2001).
157. See id. at § 716.
158. See discussion infra Section II.A. L.d.
159. See In re Soni, 54 F.3d 746, 750 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("[c]onsistent with the rule that all
evidence of nonobviousness must be considered when assessing patentability, the PTO must
consider comparative data in the specification in determining whether the claimed invention
provides unexpected results").
160. 37 CFR § 1.132. However, where practical, the latter may be avoided because they
possibly, depending on all facts and circumstances, expose applicants and practitioners to the
vulnerabilities of attack under Rule 56 (Duty of Candor and Good Faith) and allegations of
inequitable conduct. 37 CFR § 1.56 ("§ 1.56 Duty to disclose information material to
patentability. (a) . . . Each individual associated with the filing and prosecution of a patent
application has a duty of candor and good faith in dealing with the Office, which includes a duty
to disclose to the Office all information known to that individual to be material to patentability
as defined in this section.").
161. Gillette Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1929 (D. Mass. 1989), affd,
919 F.2d 720 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also Am. Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Travenol Labs., Inc., 745
F.2d 1, 8 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding that the burden is not on patentee to prove new and
surprising results, but is on the patent challenger to establish the lack of new and surprising
results).
162. Gillette, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1960.
163. See In re Tiffin, 448 F.2d 791, 792 (C.C.P.A 1971) (objective evidence of
nonobviousness including commercial success must be commensurate in scope with the claims).
M.P.E.P., supra note 59, at § 716.03(a).
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patentee "need not sell every conceivable embodiment of the claims
in order to rely upon evidence of commercial success" and
"[c]ommercial success evidence should be considered [by the
examiner] 'so long as what was sold was within the scope of the
claims."' 16 And in this context, the court has held that
"commensurate in scope" means that "the commercial success must
be due to claimed features, and not due to unclaimed features."16 s
Alternatively, if the applicant seeks to rely on evidence of
"unexpected results," the court has held that the testing and results
must at least provide one of skill in the art with an "adequate basis for
reasonably concluding that [all of the] compositions included by the
claims would behave in the same [unexpectedly superior] manner as
the . . . test composition[s]." Thus, courts have held that although
not all species within a claim must be tested, those tested must be
sufficiently "representative" to support a conclusion of unexpected
results. 167
C. Hindsight Is Impermissible in an Obviousness Analysis
As previously stated supra,168  neither the subjective
motivations1 69 of the inventors, 170 nor their level of skill is relevant
during an obviousness determination. 17  Rather, by statute, the proper
164. In re Glatt Air Techniques, Inc., 630 F.3d 1026, 1030 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citations
omitted).
165. M.P.E.P., supra note 59, at § 716.03(a).
166. In re Greenfield, 571 F.2d 1185, 1189 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
167. See In re Payne, 606 F.2d 303, 316 (C.C.P.A. 1979) ("[W]here an applicant tests less
than all the cited compounds, the test must be sufficient to permit a conclusion respecting the
relative effectiveness of applicant's claimed compounds and the compounds of the closest prior
art.") (citations omitted); see also In re Chupp, 816 F.2d 643, 646 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("In Payne,
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals said the mere submission of some evidence that a new
compound possesses some unpredictable properties does not require an automatic conclusion of
nonobviousness in every case. The Payne court held that the evidence submitted in that case was
insufficient to rebut a prima facie case of obviousness, because the claimed compound was
compared with too few prior art compounds. . . . That is not the situation in this case.") (citations
omitted).
168. See discussion infra Section II.A.l.c.
169. Subjective motivations are, for example, what the applicant(s) "would have known or
would likely have done, faced with the revelations of references." See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v.
Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 454 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("Inventors, as a class, according to the
concepts underlying the Constitution and the statutes that have created the patent system,
possess something-call it what you will-which sets them apart from the workers of ordinary
skill, and one should not go about determining obviousness under § 103 by inquiring into what
patentees ... would have known or would likely have done, faced with the revelations of
references.").
170. See Life Techs., Inc. v. Clontech Labs., Inc., 224 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
171. See Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 963 (Fed.
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perspective is that of a POSITA.17 2 A POSITA represents a
hypothetical person presumed to be aware of all pertinent prior art in
the area of the invention.173 A POSITA also possesses ordinary
creativity and exercises common sense when analyzing the available
knowledge in the art.17 4
Thus, in theory, the obviousness determination should be carried
out considering the state of the art at the time the invention was made
without taking into account any knowledge derived from the claimed
invention.175 Accordingly, the proper analysis should be done through
the eyes of a POSITA who is mindful of all relevant information but
without using the invention as a blueprint in order to piece together
the teachings of the prior art. As explained by the Federal Circuit:
It is difficult but necessary that the decision maker forget what he
or she has been taught . .. about the claimed invention and cast the
mind back to the time the invention was made ... to occupy the
mind of one skilled in the art who is presented only with the
references, and who is normally guided by the then-accepted
wisdom in the art. 176
The Supreme Court has equally cautioned against the risk of retracing
the inventor's path with hindsight: "[a] factfinder should be aware ...
of the distortion caused by hindsight bias and must be cautious of
arguments reliant upon ex post reasoning."' 77 Thus, in general,
practitioners, USPTO officials, and judges agree that hindsight is
impermissible in an obviousness analysis. In practice, however, it is
often difficult for the factfinder to set aside any knowledge of the
claimed invention to avoid "picking and choosing" isolated
disclosures to improperly render the claimed invention obvious.178
Despite admonitions against employing hindsight during
obviousness analysis, proponents of obviousness often fall into the
Cir. 1986).
172. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 103(a).
173. In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("Obviousness is determined
from the vantage point of a hypothetical person having ordinary skill in the art to which the
patent pertains. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). . . . The legal construct also presumes that all prior art
references in the field of the invention are available to this hypothetical skilled artisan. See In re
Carlson, 983 F.2d 1032, 1038, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d 1207, 1211 (Fed. Cir. 1993).").
174. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007); see also W. Union Co. v.
MoneyGram Payment Sys, Inc., 626 F.3d 1361, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
175. Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil, 774 F.2d 1132, 1138 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
176. W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(emphasis added).
177. KSR, 550 U.S. at 421.
178. See In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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trap of doing so, presumably unknowingly. Unfortunately, judges can
find such arguments to have facial appeal, based on the appearance of
an easy solution to an acknowledged need, even though the
appearance starts from the solution and works backwards to the
problem. Lead Prior Art directly addresses the problems of hindsight
bias during obviousness analysis. Understanding the sources and
nature of such biases, however, is important for understanding why
Lead Prior Art is a justifiable improvement to the existing
obviousness rubric.
1. Hindsight Could Be Improperly Employed to Retrace
the Inventor's Path and Piece Together Prior Art
Elements That Would Not Have Been Combined
Otherwise
The law requires that an invention be considered "as a whole"
for purposes of assessing its obviousness. 179 As the late Chief Judge
Markey remarked, "[o]nly God works from nothing. Men must work
with old elements."18 0 Thus, at first impression, many inventions may
seem to differ from the prior art only in that they are "new
combinations of existing principles or features."' 8 ' Nonetheless, the
value of these inventions should not be immediately discounted.
Moreover, because "[h]umans do not create from nothing; they must
employ the principles of engineering and physics and their
experience. It cannot be the law that the only inventions patentable
are those that cannot be explained by any known principles of
engineering or physics."182 Consequently:
The "as a whole" instruction in title 35 prevents evaluation of the
invention part by part. Without this important requirement, an
obviousness assessment might break an invention into its
component parts (A + B + C), then find a prior art reference
containing A, another containing B, and another containing C, and
on that basis alone declare the invention obvious. This form of
hindsight reasoning, using the invention as a roadmap to find its
prior art components, would discount the value of combining
179. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 103(a).
180. Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 755 F.2d 1549, 1556 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
("'Only God works from nothing. Men must work with old elements."') (quoting Markey, Why
Not the Statute?, 65 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 331, 345 (1983)).
181. See Environmental Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co. of C.A., 713 F.2d 693, 698 (Fed.
Cir. 1983) ("virtually all inventions are combinations of old elements.").
182. Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 774 F.2d 1082, 1097-98 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(citations omitted).
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various existing features or principles in a new wa to achieve a
new result-often the very definition of invention.18
The courts have recognized that, sometimes,
a patentable invention may lie in the discovery of a source of a
problem even though the remedy may be obvious once the source
of the problem is identified. This is part of analyzing the "subject
matter as a whole," which should always be considered in
determining the obviousness of an invention under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103.184
For example, before the Federal Circuit came into existence, the
United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals ("CCPA")
considered a case where a problem of "undesirable stressing of fuel
rods" in nuclear reactors was known in the prior art, but where the
inventor was the only person who recognized that the source of the
stressing was "sticking" between certain elements.185 In that case, the
inventor prevailed over the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
("BPAI")' 8 6 because,
"[where] there is no evidence of record that a person of ordinary
skill in the art at the time of [an applicant's] invention would have
expected [a problem]," e.g., sticking, "to exist at all, it is not proper
to conclude that [an invention]," e.g., roughening one of the
contact surfaces, "which solves this problem,. . . would have been
obvious to that hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art."18 7
Similarly, an unclaimed advantage of an invention cannot be
isolated and treated with hindsight as being the invention itself,
because "treating the advantage as the invention disregards the
183. Ruiz v. A. B. Chance Co., 357 F.3d 1270, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (emphasis added);
see also Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
("The large number of references, as a whole, relied upon by the district court to show
obviousness, about twenty in number, skirt all around but do not as a whole suggest the claimed
invention, which they must, to overcome the presumed validity . . . .Focusing on the
obviousness of substitutions and differences instead of on the invention as a whole . . . was a
legally improper way to simplify the difficult determination of obviousness.") (citations
omitted).
184. In re Sponnoble, 405 F.2d 578, 585 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
185. See In re Peehs, 612 F.2d 1287, 1290 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
186. The Board of Patent Interferences and Appeals is the body within the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office in which a patent applicant may appeal an examiner's final rejection,
including ex parte and inter partes reexamination rejections, as well as the forum for deciding
priority disputes in interferences. See 35 U.S.C. § 6(b) ("The Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences shall, on written appeal of an applicant, review adverse decisions of examiners
upon applications for patents and shall determine priority and patentability of invention in
interferences. . . ."
187. Chapman v. Casner 315 F. App'x. 294, 299 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citations omitted).
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statutory requirement that the invention be viewed 'as a whole,'
ignores the problem-recognition element, and injects an improper
'obvious to try' consideration." 88 To be sure, in analyzing "obvious
to try," the Federal Circuit has articulated two specific situations
where "obvious to try" was "erroneously equated" with obviousness.
In one such improper situation
what would have been "obvious to try" would have been to vary all
parameters or try each of numerous possible choices until one
possibly arrived at a successful result, where the prior art gave
either no indication of which parameters were critical or no
direction as to which of many possible choices is likely to be
successful. 189
In such circumstances, where a defendant merely throws
metaphorical darts at a board filled with combinatorial prior art
possibilities, courts should not succumb to hindsight claims of
obviousness.... The second class of O'Farrell's impermissible
"obvious to try" situations occurs where "what was 'obvious to try'
was to explore a new technology or general approach that seemed
to be a promising field of experimentation, where the prior art gave
only general guidance as to the particular form of the claimed
invention or how to achieve it."1 90
In cases where an inventive contribution lies in a discovery of a
cause of a problem, obviousness analysis does not turn on whether the
solution to the problem would have been obvious. Specifically, in a
recent dissenting opinion, Judge Rader recognized that, in such cases,
as in Eibel, Conover, and Sponnable, "the crux of the matter is the
discovery by appellant [of the cause of a problem]", and the
determinative question is whether that cause would have been
recognized by a POSITA at the time the invention was made.191
He noted how "[t]his case, as are Eibel, Conover, Sponnoble, and
Peehs, is distinguished from KSR because there were no 'finite
number of identified, predictable solutions' that were used to discover
the source of and solution to the problems."l 92 This distinction is
particularly relevant because
[w]hen there is a design need or market pressure to solve a
188. Jones v. Hardy, 727 F.2d 1524, 1530 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (citing In re Antonie, 559 F.2d
618 (C.C.P.A. 1977)).
189. In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d
894, 903 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
190. Id. (citing In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
191. Chapman, 315 F. App'x. at 299 (Rader, J., dissenting).
192. Id.
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problem and there are a finite number of identified, predictable
solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the
known options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads to the
anticipated success, it is likely the roduct not of innovation but of
ordinary skill and common sense.
Yet, frequently, the cause of the problem to be solved is well known
and the claimed solution, once disclosed, appears simple.19 4 However,
"[a]n inventor will not be denied a patent simply because his
invention embodies a solution which seems simple and obvious with
the benefit of hindsight."l 9 5 Fortunately, courts have also noted that
"[t]he invention here in dispute is simple and there is an inclination to
find such simple things to be obvious. However, if the invention were
so obvious, why hadn't anyone come up with it ... ?"196
Under the theory of § 103, particularly as construed in Graham,
if after a proper search and review of the prior art, an invention is
found to be novel, the invention is also not obvious until proven
otherwise.19 7 That is the essence of placing the burden of establishing
a prima facie case of obviousness, and ultimately obviousness, on
both the PTO and the patent challenger.
As the 2010 Guidelines note, several "lines of reasoning" could
be used to support an obviousness determination.198 For example,
even if the PTO asserts a prima facie case of obviousness against an
invention alleging it to be an obvious modification or combination of
select prior art references, the law requires that the PTO provide more
than the identity of the selected applied references to establish a
193. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007).
194. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Ray-O-Vac Co., 321 U.S. 275, 279 (1944)
("Viewed after the event, the means Anthony adopted seem simple and such as should have
been obvious to those who worked in the field, but this is not enough to negative invention.")
195. Globe Linings, Inc. v. City of Corvallis, 555 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 985 (1977).
196. State Industries, Inc. v. Mor-Flo Industries, Inc., 639 F. Supp. 937, 945 (E.D. Tenn.
1986) (emphasis added); see also DePuy Spine v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d
1314, 1328-29 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (the Federal Circuit considered objective evidence of "failure of
others" to show that the alleged infringer was unsuccessfully working on a solution different to
the claimed invention until the alleged infringer found out about the claimed invention and
changed its research accordingly).
197. See In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("In proceedings before the
Patent and Trademark Office, the Examiner bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case
of obviousness based upon the prior art."); In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
("As adapted to ex parte procedure, Graham is interpreted as continuing to place the 'burden of
proof on the Patent Office which requires it to produce the factual basis for its rejection of an
application under sections 102 and 103'.") (quoting In re Warner, 379 F.2d 1011, 1016, 154
U.S.P.Q. 173, 177 (C.C.P.A. 1967)); see also M.P.E.P., supra note 59, at §§ 701, 706.
198. See 2010 KSR Guidelines Update, supra note 81, at 53,643, 53,644.
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legitimate prima facie case.' 99 Rather, the PTO needs to provide a
rationale explaining why a POSITA would have had reason to (i)
"select," 20 0 "combine," and "modify" all prior art teachings that the
PTO seeks to apply against the invention, and (ii) to do so for the
purpose of obtaining the claimed invention with a reasonable
201
expectation of success.
Courts have held that the PTO's rationale can differ from that
relied on by the inventor during the inventor's development efforts. 202
If the Office cannot assemble any such rationale, however, the
proponent of obviousness has not carried its burden of pleading the
elements of a prima facie case of obviousness. The same requirement
203
applies to a litigant seeking to in invalidate an issued patent.
Accordingly, the patented invention is presumptively nonobvious
over the asserted references, absent subsequent evidence to the
199. See Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 464 F.3d 1286, 1290-91 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ("legal
determinations of obviousness . . . should be based on evidence rather than on mere speculation
or conjecture. . .. '[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory
statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to
support the legal conclusion of obviousness."') (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 987-88 (Fed.
Cir. 2006)); see also M.P.E.P., supra note 59, at § 706.02(j).
200. See Daiichi Sankyo Co., Ltd. v. Matrix Labs., Ltd., 619 F.3d 1346, 1352 (Fed. Cir.
2010); see, e.g., Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350, 1356-57
(Fed. Cir. 2007).
201. See Examination Guidelines for Determining Obviousness Under 35 U.S.C. 103 in
View of the Supreme Court Decision in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 72 Fed. Reg.
57,526, 57,529 (Oct. 10, 2007) ("To reject a claim based on this rationale, Office personnel must
resolve the Graham factual inquiries. Office personnel must then articulate the following: (1) a
finding that there was some teaching, suggestion, or motivation, either in the references
themselves or in the knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art, to modify
the reference or to combine reference teachings; (2) a finding that there was reasonable
expectation of success; and (3) whatever additional findings based on the Graham factual
inquiries may be necessary, in view of the facts of the case under consideration, to explain a
conclusion of obviousness.").
202. See In re Lintner, 458 F.2d 1013, 1016 (C.C.P.A. 1972) ("The fact that appellant uses
[an invention] for a different purpose does not alter the conclusion that its use in a prior art
composition would be prima facie obvious from the purpose disclosed in the references."); In re
Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1202 (Fed. CiT. 2004) ("'the Board need not have found the combination
of Bowerman and Pope to be desirable for the reason stated in the ... application."); In re
Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 703 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("It is immaterial that the prior art homologue may
not be recognized or known to be useful for the same purposes or to possess the same properties
as the claimed compound."') (citation omitted).
203. See Stratoflex, Inc., v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("[T]he
party asserting invalidity not only has the procedural burden of proceeding first and establishing
a prima-facie case, but the burden of persuasion on the merits remains with that party until final
decision. The party supporting validity has no initial burden to prove validity, having been given
a procedural advantage requiring that he come forward only after a prima-facie case of
invalidity has been made. With all the evidence in, the trial court must determine whether the
party on which the statute imposes the burden of persuasion has carried that burden.").
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contrary. While no such legal presumption can be said to exist until a
patent issues, the Board of Patent Appeals and InterferenceS204 has
reiterated that:
[w]hile the analysis under 35 U.S.C. § 103 allows flexibility in
determining whether a claimed invention would have been obvious
[citing KSR], it still requires showing that 'there was an apparent
reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by
the patent at issue.'. . . 'We must still be careful not to allow
hindsight reconstruction of references to reach the claimed
invention without any explanation as to how or why the references
would be combined to produce the claimed invention.' 205
Ultimately, the Graham factors provide the "background"
against which "the obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject
matter is determined."20 6 As such, ascertaining the proper
"background" is the sine qua non to a proper obviousness analysis.
Lead Prior Art provides the means to ascertain the proper
"background" objectively and in a manner that avoids hindsight.
2. Lead Prior Art Paradigm Provides the Proper
"Background" Against Which the Obviousness or
Nonobviousness of the Subject Matter Is Determined
Having plumbed the depths of the prima facie case and focused
on the evils of hindsight, we now turn to instructive judicial examples
to see how the Lead Prior Art paradigm can be used to understand
judicial results. Indeed, one of the contexts providing instructive
examples on how the courts have applied such principles to avoid
hindsight in a way that is consistent with our Lead Prior Art
methodology is the use of the Lead Compound approach in
determining the patentability of chemical compounds. As such,
applicants seeking to undermine a prima facie case of obviousness
raised over a particular structurally-similar compound in the prior art
can remind the Office that it has the initial burden to come forth with
a "reasoned identification of [that structurally similar compound] as a
lead compound" in the prior art.207
204. See supra note 186.
205. See, e.g., Ex parte Subramanyam, No. 2010-002463, 2010 WL 1253713, at *3
(B.P.A.I. Mar. 29, 2010); Ex parte Han, No. 2010-008633, 2011 WL 798184, at *3 (B.P.A.I.
Mar. 3, 2011).
206. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
207. See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA Inc., 566 F.3d 985, 994 (Fed. Cir.
2009) ("An obviousness argument based on structural similarity between claimed and prior art
compounds 'clearly depends on a preliminary finding that one of ordinary skill in the art would
5892011]
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To be sure, as the 2010 Guidelines summarized, "[a]ny known
compound may serve a lead compound when there is some reason for
starting with that lead compound and modifying it to obtain the
claimed compound." 20 8 That is consistent with our Lead Prior Art
methodology, wherein it is made clear that the Office has the initial
burden of establishing a reason for selecting a prior art compound(s)
as well as some reason 209 for modifying the applied art. Logically,
because the Office needs to find a reason for each of those steps, the
easiest argument to build is for the Office to select the closest
structural homolog as the lead compound and allege as the requisite
rationale for both its selection and modification that "the claimed and
prior art compounds possess a 'sufficiently close relationship ... to
create an expectation,' [the reason to modify] in light of the totality of
the prior art, that the new compound will have 'similar properties' to
the old." 210
Nevertheless, the Office will need to provide a rationale for
narrowing the possibilities to the so-called closest prior art the Office
seeks to apply. Perhaps, an exception occurs when the Office can
prove that the invention would have been "obvious to try." However,
that line of reasoning will only work if the Office shows:
there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem and
there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions [that] a
person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue .... In that
instance the fact that a combination was obvious to try might show
that it was obvious under § 103.211
Patents to pharmaceutical blockbusters are frequently
challenged,212 due to the potentially lucrative outcome of generic
entry if generic manufacturers can overcome the innovator's
exclusivity. 2 13 In such cases, non-obviousness of the claimed
have selected [the prior art compound] as a lead compound.' Takeda, 492 F.3d. at 1359; see also
Eisai Co. Ltd. v. Dr. Reddy's Labs., Ltd., 533 F.3d 1353, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (stating that
'post-KSR, a prima facie case of obviousness for a chemical compound still, in general, begins
with the reasoned identification ofa lead compound' in the prior art).").
208. 2010 KSR Guidelines Update, supra note 81, at 53,651.
209. See Takeda Chem. Indus. Ltd. v. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350, 1356-57
(Fed. Cir. 2007).
210. Eisai Co. Ltd. v. Dr. Reddy's Labs., Ltd., 533 F.3d 1353, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(quoting Aventis Pharma Deutschland GmbH v. Lupin, Ltd., 499 F.3d 1293, 1301 (Fed. Cir.
2007)).
211. KSR Int'l. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007).
212. See Generics' Patent Challenges Reached Record Level in 2010, FDANEWS, Mar.
21, 2011, http://www.fdanews.com/newsletter/article?articleld=135219&issueld=14567.
213. See Krishan Maggon, Top Ten/Twenty Best Selling Drugs 2009, KNOL,
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compounds or compositions is almost always at issue.214 At least one
generic manufacturer unsuccessfully tried recently to catch the
Supreme Court's attention by urging that the patentee wins in a
disproportionate number of cases.215
Over the last decade, the presumption of validity for various new
chemical compounds has been upheld on the lack of a rationale for
selecting suitable starting points in the prior art to arrive at the
claimed invention.2 16 Typically, the challenger successfully located a
closely related compound in the prior art but failed to make one of
two related showings; either that a POSITA would have selected that
compound for modification from many alternatives (in our view, the
prior art compound selected was not within the relevant scope and
content of the prior art and was thus not a piece(s) of Lead Prior Art),
or that the POSITA would possess a requisite motivation for engaging
in the modifications of the selected compound to achieve the claimed
compound. In other words, the prior art compound may well have
been within the piece(s) of the Lead Prior Art, but there was no
straightforward pathway for bridging the differences between the
claimed compound and the prior art.2 17
http://knol.google.com/k/top-ten-twenty-best-selling-drugs-2009# (last visited Feb. 26, 2011)
(showing that annual sales of the top 5 best-selling brand-name drugs in 2009 were between
$6.91M-$12.45M).
214. The Hatch-Waxman Act, Act (21 U.S.C. § 355) is the statutory scheme whereby
generic drug manufacturers can file an Abbreviated New Drug Application ("ANDA") seeking
FDA approval for a generic version of a patented drug. The ANDA applicant either requests
approval upon the expiration of the patent or requests approval based on an assertion that the
patent is invalid (a paragraph IV certification). If an ANDA is filed with a paragraph IV
certification, the patentee has a certain amount of time in which to sue the ANDA applicant for
infringement and defend the validity of its patent. The result is that the vast majority of
pharmaceutical patent litigation is ANDA litigation, with a assertion of invalidity.
215. See Mylan Inc. v. Daiichi Sankyo Co., Ltd., No. 10-770, 2010 WL 5069543, at *12
(Appellate Petition, Motion and Filing) (U.S. Dec. 8, 2010) (arguing that 6 of 8 post-KSR
Federal Circuit compound and pharmaceutical method of treatment cases found
nonobviousness: "As the following table demonstrates, the Federal Circuit is effectively
applying a much higher standard to chemical compounds than it does to other inventions, even
within the chemical arts.").
216. See, e.g., Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 550 F.3d 1075 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Procter
& Gamble Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 989 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Takeda Chem. Indus.,
Ltd. v. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Eisai Co. Ltd. V. Dr. Reddy's
Labs., Ltd., 533 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Daiichi Sankyo Co., Ltd. v. Matrix Labs., Ltd., 619
F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 520 F.3d 1358
(Fed. Cir. 2008).
217. See discussion of Eisai infra Section IV.B.
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3. Hindsight Could Also Wrongly Be Employed to
Identify "Similar" Subject Matter or to Say That
Existing Elements in the Prior Art Could Be
Predictably Modified to Solve Other Problems
Similarity between the prior art and the claimed invention are
questions of quality, i.e., is it a sensible prior art starting point, and of
degree, i.e., is there a straightforward path from that starting point to
the claimed invention. As the court said in In re Papesch,218 in the
context of chemical compounds, "the patentability of the thing does
not depend on the similarity of its formula to that of another
compound but of the similarity of the former compound to the
latter." 2 19 Proper questions to ask are: "how similar and dissimilar are
the two molecules; and what are the implications of these similarities
and dissimilarities to a person of ordinary skill in the art in light of
prior art at the time of the invention." 220 In other words, obviousness-
type "similarity" should exist only if a person of ordinary skill in the
art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in the
modification or combination. 221 Thus, nonobviousness exists in
performing a modification or combination in the absence of a
reasonable expectation of success, because without a reasonable
expectation of success, there is no prima facie case of obviousness.
And, of course, the modification/combination must be
straightforward. In Lead Prior Art terminology, a straightforward path
from a sensible starting point to the claimed invention is lacking
and/or a reasonable expectation of success is lacking.
In addition, modifications to starting points grounded in
proposed lead prior art may not provide a reasonable expectation of
success because the modification would destroy what would be
otherwise known as advantageous properties of the prior art
compound. In other words, assuming that the challenger happens
upon a sensible prior art starting point, there can be no
straightforward path to the claimed invention if that path would
destroy touted advantages and/or properties of the sensible starting
point prior art.
218. In re Papesch, 315 F.2d 381 (C.C.P.A. 1963).
219. Id. at 391.
220. Abbott Laboratories v. Andrx Pharm., Inc. 452 F.3d 1331, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
221. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharms., Inc., 471 F.3d 1369, 1377-78 (Fed.
Cir. 2006) (discussing how a POSITA cannot simply take various components and combine
them without a commonality of purpose or characteristics that gives the artisan some reasonable
expectation of success).
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For example, in Eisai, the court explained that "[t]he record,
however, shows no discernible reason for a skilled artisan to begin
with lansoprazole only to drop the very feature, the fluorinated
,,222
substituent, that gave this advantageous property. Consequently,
although lansoprazole was "the closest prior art," it was not the proper
223
starting point in the prior art for a prima facie case of obviousness.
In such contexts, pharmaceutical activity of a prior art compound
is not always required. The 2010 Guidelines caution examiners to
recognize that:
[A] proper obviousness rejection of a claimed compound that is
useful as a drug might be made beginning with an inactive
compound, if, for example, the reasons for modifying a prior art
compound to arrive at the claimed compound have nothing to do
with pharmaceutical activity. The inactive compound would not be
considered to be a lead compound by pharmaceutical chemists, but
could potentially be used as such when considering obviousness.
Office personnel might also base an obviousness rejection on a
known compound that pharmaceutical chemists would not select as
a lead compound due to expense, handling issues, or other business
considerations.224
In that situation, the use of hindsight is possibly avoided because, in
an allegation of the existence of a prima facie case, "there must be
some reason for starting with that lead compound other than the mere
fact that the 'lead compound' merely exists."225 In that sense, the PTO
guidelines are consistent with Dillon, discussed infra,226 in looking for
and establishing a reason on the record, other than its mere existence,
for why that inactive prior art compound is a sensible starting point.
In Sanofi-Synthelabo,22 7 a decision consistent with the Lead
Prior Art paradigm, the issue was whether the claimed dextrorotatory
228isomer was obvious in view of its presence in the known racemate.
The patent challenger, Apotex, argued that the prior art PCR 4099
was the "lead candidate" for prior research and the fact that PCR 4099
was an enantiomer of the claimed compound "outweighs the effect of
any unexpected or unpredictable properties of the separated
222. Eisai Co. Ltd. V. Dr. Reddy's Labs., Ltd., 533 F.3d 1353, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
223. Id. at 1359.
224. 2010 KSR Guidelines Update, supra note 81, at 53,643, 53,651-52.
225. Id. at 53,652.
226. See discussion infra Section IV.C.
227. Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 550 F.3d 1075 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
228. Id. at 1078, 1082.
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dextrorotatory enantiomer."229 Sanofi submitted contrary evidence,
for example, that although "a person of ordinary skill in this field in
the mid-1980s would have known that enantiomers can exhibit
different biological activities . . . that it was not predictable whether
such differences, if any, would be weak, moderate, or strong, or how
they would be manifested." 2 30
The district court in Sanofi was convinced that a POSITA would
not have considered the allegedly invalidating prior art as the
appropriate starting point for modification; it was not the "lead
candidate" at the time of the invention. Nor was there a reasonable
expectation of success for the claimed invention in view of PCR
4099. In particular, a POSITA would "not reasonably have predicted
that the dextrorotatory enantiomer would provide all of the
antiplatelet activity and none of the adverse neurotoxicity." 231 The
district court recognized that "the wide range of possible outcomes
and the relative unlikelihood that the resulting compound would
exhibit the maximal increase in anti-platelet aggregation activity and
the absence of neurotoxicity makes clopidogrel bisulfate non-
obvious."232 In other words, PCR 4099 provided no expectation of the
success ultimately discovered in clopidogrel bisulfate.
In Sanofi, the Federal Circuit affirmed the holding of
nonobviousness, noting that only hindsight supported the argument
that the enantiomer was the appropriate starting point:
Only with hindsight knowledge that the dextrorotatory enantiomer
has highly desirable properties, can Apotex argue that it would
have been obvious to select this particular racemate and undertake
its arduous separation. The application of hindsight is
inappropriate where the prior art does not suggest that this
enantiomer could reasonably be expected to manifest the properties
and advantages that were found for this particular dextrorotatory
isomer. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 36, 86 S.Ct. 684 (cautioning
against hindsight whereby the teachings of the invention are read
into the prior art); see also KSR v. Teleflex, 127 S.Ct. at 1742
(recognizing "hindsight bias" and "ex post reasoning" as
inappropriate in determination of obviousness). 233
229. Id. at 1086.
230. Id. at 1087.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 1089.
233. Id. at 1088 (emphasis added).
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III. PROBATIVE VALUE OF OBJECTIVE INDICIA EVIDENCE MAY
SOMETIMES BE LIMITED
Objective indicia of nonobviousness may be used to rebut a
prima facie case of obviousness, as discussed supra,234 and can be
helpful or even important to an obviousness determination. But, as
discussed below, empirical evidence from Federal Circuit opinions
post-KSR suggests that the persuasive value of economic objective
indicia of nonobviousness, discussed below, can be in-practice
secondary 235 to the persuasive value of evidence supporting prima
facie obviousness. In some cases, the court stated that strong evidence
supporting a prima facie case of obviousness could not be rebutted by
any amount of economic objective indicia of nonobviousness.2 36
Thus, the issue of obviousness can be "won or lost" at the
determination of prima facie obviousness.
The authors use the term "economic objective indicia of
nonobviousness" to refer to objective indicia of nonobviousness that
are unrelated to particular elements of the claimed invention, such as
"long-felt but unresolved needs," "commercial success," "licensing,"
"copying," "praise of others," "failure of others," and other similar
concepts.237 Non-economic objective indicia of nonobviousness,
which relate to particular elements of the claimed invention, include
"unexpected results" and "teaching away." 238
This conclusion regarding the importance of the determination of
prima facie obviousness naturally arises from the requirement to
consider all evidence 239 and render a conclusion of obviousness or
nonobviousness with respect to the appropriate burden of proof.240
Naturally, weak evidence supporting nonobviousness should not
overcome strong evidence supporting obviousness. This conclusion,
however, also arises from a pattern of attributing differing weights to
differing types of evidence, as discussed below.
234. See discussion supra Section II.A.I.d.
235. The authors acknowledge that some cases expressly state that secondary
considerations evidence can be the most probative evidence to the determination of obviousness
or nonobviousness. See supra note 87.
236. See cases cited infra note 242.
237. Recall that the objective indicia of nonobviousness identified in Graham were not
intended to be an exhaustive list. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17-
18 ("Such secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure
of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the
subject matter sought to be patented.") (emphasis added).
238. See discussion supra Section II.A.I.d.
239. See discussion supra Section II.A.1.d.
240. See discussion supra Section II.B.
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Case law evaluating the probative value of objective indicia of
nonobviousness, however, suggests that this type of evidence can be
attributed less probative weight than evidence of prima facie
obviousness, as discussed in the paragraphs that follow. As the
empirical results below show, establishing a prima facie case of
obviousness can nearly or literally preclude the practical possibility of
rebutting strong evidence supporting a prima facie case of
obviousness through economic objective indicia of nonobviousness.
Accordingly, the importance of correctly determining in the first place
whether a proper prima facie case of obviousness has been
established is extremely important because a rebuttal of that prima
facie case may be practically impossible under certain circumstances.
This conclusion was reached after reviewing twenty-five Federal
Circuit opinions involving economic objective indicia of
nonobviousness published post-KSR. For each case, the court's
characterization of the overall strength of the evidence supporting a
prima facie case of obviousness and the overall strength of economic
objective indicia of nonobviousness was discerned from the court's
opinion. Then, cases involving similar strengths of evidence
supporting the prima facie obviousness determination were organized
into distinct groups.
What emerged from this analysis was that the factual patterns of
the cases fell into four distinct categories. A first category involved
what might be termed "very strong evidence of prima facie
obviousness." In cases within the first category, every element of the
claimed invention was undisputedly taught in the cited references or
at most a small number of elements of the claimed invention were
merely minor variations from what was disclosed in the references
and a strong "motivation to combine" or "reasonable expectation of
success" existed under the facts of these cases.241
241. See Geo M. Martin Co. v. Alliance Machine Sys. Int'l. LLC., 618 F.3d 1294 (Fed.
Cir. 2010) (differences between cited references and claims were only minimal and those
differences were limited to only a few options); King Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eon Labs, Inc.,
616 F.3d 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (all elements disclosed by the references); Wyers v. Master Lock
Co., 616 F.3d 1231 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (all claim elements taught by combination of three
references, involving known elements achieving predictable results); Dow Jones & Co. v.
Ablaise Ltd., 606 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (all elements disclosed in references save one,
which was readily apparent to the Court); Media Techs. Licensing, LLC v. Upper Deck Co., 596
F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (one element not disclosed by references but differences between
references and claims were minor); Perfect Web Techs., Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc., 587 F.3d 1324
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (all elements disclosed but one-repeat steps on failure, which was readily
apparent because "one could do little else"); Ritchie v. Vast Resources, Inc., 563 F.3d 1334
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (all elements disclosed; new use of known material achieved predictable
results); Rothman v. Target Corp., 556 F.3d 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (all elements clearly
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Seventeen cases fell into this first category and all seventeen
holdings ultimately found the claimed invention to be obvious;
attempts to rebut the prima facie case of obviousness with economic
objective indicia of nonobviousness were uniformly unsuccessful.
Some opinions expressly acknowledged the analytical importance of
objective indicia of nonobviousness but effectively stated that no
secondary considerations evidence could rebut such a strong showing
242
of prima facie obviousness.
This characterization of cases in the first category is not intended
to suggest that the court was unwilling to consider objective indicia of
nonobviousness because the court has (post-KSR) stated that objective
indicia of nonobviousness must be considered and can be very
important to a proper evaluation of obviousness.2 43
disclosed and motivation to combine existed); Ball Aerosol & Speciality Container, Inc. v.
Limited Brands, Inc., 555 F.3d 984 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (all elements undisputedly disclosed in
references; "motivation to combine" disputed by parties but Court felt that it was clear;
combination involved familiar elements achieving predictable results); Boston Scientific
Scimed, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 554 F.3d 982 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (all elements disclosed and
motivation to combine was apparent to Court); Sundance, Inc. v. Demonte Fabricating Ltd., 550
F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (two references combined to teach all elements; mere mechanic's
skill required to combine the references, rather than inventive skill); In re DBC, 545 F.3d 1373
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (only one element was missing from references but that element was readily
apparent); Asyst Techs., Inc. v. Emtrak Inc., 544 F.3d 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (all elements
disclosed); Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (all elements
disclosed but one-use of web browser, which was readily apparent); Scanner Techs. Corp. v.
ICOS Vision Sys. Corp. N.V., 528 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (minor variation of the claims
was taught in a single reference but differences between reference and claims were well within
the ordinary skill of a POSITA); Agrizap, Inc. v. Woodstream Corp., 520 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (very strong prima facie obviousness evidence [all elements disclosed except for a
resistive switch rather than a mechanical switch)); Pharmastem Therapeutics, Inc. v. Viacell,
Inc., 491 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (all elements disclosed in references; reasonable
expectation of success established through inventor admission); Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-
Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (all elements disclosed but one-the use of
electronics, which was readily apparent).
242. See Wyers, 616 F.3d at 1246 ("Moreover, secondary considerations of
nonobviousness-considered here by the district court-simply cannot overcome a strong prima
facie case of obviousness."); Sundance, 550 F.3d at 1368 ("Secondary considerations of
nonobviousness-considered here by the district court-simply cannot overcome this strong
prima facie case of obviousness."); see also Agrizap, 520 F.3d 1337.
243. In the context of a post-KSR motion for summary judgment of invalidity, the Federal
Circuit has held that refusal to consider objective evidence of nonobviousness, where a genuine
issue of material fact exists, is reversible error. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v.
Maersk Contractors USA, Inc, 617 F.3d 1296, 1304-05 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Moore, J.) ("In its
opinion, the district court ignored [the "substantial" proffered] objective evidence of
nonobviousness. Though the court cited Graham, it indicates that the court is required to
consider only the first three factors. . . . We hold that the district court erred by failing to
consider . . . objective evidence of nonobviousness. Our case law is clear that this type of
evidence 'must be considered in evaluating the obviousness of a claimed invention.' . . . To be
clear, a district court must always consider any objective evidence of nonobviousness presented
598 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 27
That characterization does reflect, however, that the court finds
certain evidence more probative of obviousness or nonobviousness, as
a general matter, than other types of evidence. Accordingly, cases in
this first category, involving strong evidence supporting a prima facie
case of obviousness, may be difficult to rebut.
It is statistically rather remarkable that seventeen of seventeen
such cases found obviousness. For such cases, therefore, it appears
that the winning argument for the patentee is to kill the prima facie
case both at the USPTO and the district courts. And if not kill, at least
maim, so that the inter partes judges will not be tempted to fall in line
with the other 100% of the decisions. And we are most hopeful that
the Lead Prior Art methodology unveiled in this article will prove to
be an effective killer of improper prima facie cases.
A second category of cases involved what might be termed
"moderately strong evidence of prima facie obviousness." Cases
within the second category involved all elements of a claimed
invention being present in the cited references but a "motivation to
combine" or "reasonable expectation of success" being in serious
dispute, or a "teaching away" existing in the prior art. Only three
cases in this empirical study fell into this category, but all three
holdings relied heavily on objective indicia of nonobviousness to find
that the claims were nonobvious. 24 Thus, although the sample size
in a case. ... Because of the failure to consider the objective evidence of nonobviousness and
because there are genuine issues of material fact remaining, we reverse the grant of summary
judgment of invalidity based on obviousness.") (citing Iron Grip Barbell Co. v. USA Sports,
Inc., 392 F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 1270, 667 (Fed.
Cir. 2004); and Richardson-Vicks Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 122 F.3d 1476, 1483 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
See also Geo. M. Martin, 618 F.3d at 1304 (stating in conjunction with an appeal of an
obviousness determination as a matter of law: "[s]econdary considerations of non-obviousness
must be considered when present"; claims nonetheless later held to be obvious).
In the context of a pre-KSR appeal from summary judgment of invalidity, the Court has shown a
willingness to make its evaluation of objective indicia of nonobviousness in a first instance on
appeal. See Iron Grip, 392 F.3d at 1323-24 ("Our precedents ... establish that failure to cite
secondary considerations, alone, is not reversible error.") (quoting Ruiz, 234 F.3d at 668). In
Iron Grip, Plaintiff asserted objective evidence of nonobviousness, including "commercial
success, "copying," and "licensing." The Court rejected each of these assertions, based on a
lack of nexus between the claims and the success, as well as other factors, and concluded that
"[the record] does not show the existence of relevant secondary factors to support patentability."
On that basis, the district court's finding of obviousness was properly affirmed. Iron Grip, 392
F.3d at 1323-25.
244. See Power-one, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc., 599 F.3d 1343, 1351-52 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(all elements disclosed in cited references but "reasonable expectation of success" was lacking
because combination of references may not have worked if combined; objective indicia of
nonobviousness was important to ultimate determination that claims were not obvious); Proctor
& Gamble Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 989, 995-98 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (although all
elements were disclosed in cited references, reasonable expectation of success was lacking and
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for this category is small (at three opinions), the results stand in stark
contrast to the results from the first category of cases, which
uniformly reached the opposite conclusion in seventeen cases.
A third category of cases involved what might be termed
"moderately weak evidence of prima facie obviousness." Cases
within this third category involved most but not all elements of the
claimed invention being disclosed in the cited references and other
weaknesses in the prima facie case of obviousness.2 45 In these cases,
the role of economic objective indicia of nonobviousness seemed
important to the determination of nonobviousness, but one wonders
whether such evidence merely reinforced a conclusion of
nonobviousness mandated by the inability of the party asserting
obviousness to persuasively establish a prima facie case of
obviousness.
A fourth category of cases involved what might be termed "very
weak evidence of prima facie obviousness." Cases within this
category involved an absence of a significant number of elements of
the claimed invention from the prior art or other serious evidentiary
shortcomings for the allegation of prima facie obviousness.24 6 Thus, a
prima facie case of obviousness could not be persuasively established,
and the court, not surprisingly, found that the claimed invention was
not obvious. In one case, the court even said that evaluation of
objective indicia of nonobviousness was unnecessary in light of the
weak evidence supporting prima facie obviousness. 2 47 And one can
unexpected results were seen; objective indicia of nonobviousness in the form of long-felt need
was influential to finding of non-obviousness); DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek,
Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1326-29 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (strong prima facie case of obviousness but strong
teach-away also present; objective indicia of nonobviousness of Defendant pursuing other path
until discovering patented technique was influential to finding of non-obviousness).
245. See Crocs, Inc. v. Int'l. Trade Comm'n., 598 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (one element
not taught by cited references; teach-away existed and unexpected results were achieved;
commercial success evidence was not rebutted so claims were non-obvious); Hearing
Components, Inc. v. Shure Inc., 600 F.3d 1357, 1372-75 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (one disputed element
was not disclosed in cited references; motivation to combine was weak; objective indicia of
nonobviousness was useful to finding of non-obviousness); Rolls-Royce, PLC v. United Techs.
Corp., 603 F.3d 1325, 1339-40 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (one element undisputedly not disclosed in cited
references; Defendant argued "obvious to try"; objective indicia of nonobviousness led to
conclusion of non-obviousness).
246. See Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (although structurally similar compounds were disclosed in cited references, nothing
guided selection of the claimed compound from large number of potential candidate
compounds; teaching-away from claimed compound existed in one reference); Ortho-McNeil
Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 520 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (significant unexpected
results, strong evidence of copying, and surprise of experts led to finding of non-obviousness).
247. See Takeda , 492 F.3d at 1363 ("In light of our conclusion that Alphapharm failed to
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certainly envision that the Lead Prior Art methodology could well
lead to the same result under those circumstances.
The pattern that emerges from the twenty-five cases discussed
above has vital importance to how the obviousness determination is
performed. An inescapable conclusion is that once strong evidence
supporting a prima facie case of obviousness is established, a party
asserting nonobviousness has a reduced chance of prevailing,
although of course every case depends on its own facts.
Thus, the importance of identifying the correct evidence, and
particularly the sensible prior art starting place when making the
initial determination of prima facie obviousness, is exceptionally
high. In essence, if the USPTO or party opponent in litigation relies
on strong but improper prior art evidence that incorrectly establishes a
prima facie case of obviousness, the shooting match may well be
over.
Therefore, parties and factfinders should realize that the
obviousness determination may be won or lost at the stage of
evaluating prima facie obviousness. For these reasons, the
contribution of Lead Prior Art methodology towards identify whether
a prima facie case of obviousness has been established-particularly
by focusing on the sensible starting point(s) in the prior art, and
whether there is a straightforward path from that art to the claimed
invention, with a reasonable expectation of success-cannot be
overstated.
IV. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROPER LEAD PRIOR ART IN A MANNER
THAT AVOIDS HINDSIGHT
The article now turns to a fundamental issue: how does one pick
one or more sensible starting point(s) for further development in the
prior art? As has been seen, we view that question as a linchpin
holding together the prima facie analysis.
In general, we found it surprising that methods for determining
the relevant scope and content of the prior art under Graham Factor 1,
or for selecting the proper prior art to be compared for differences to
the claimed invention in Graham Factor 2, have not been an object of
central focus by the courts. 248 In many cases, with exceptions noted
below, the prior art is selected by the examiner during prosecution or
prove that the claimed compounds would have been prima facie obvious, we need not consider
any objective indicia of nonobviousness.")
248. See, for example, the cases discussed infra Section IV.A.
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by a patent challenger during litigation.249
Our observation is that, often, the propriety of the selection of
that prior art is not questioned.25 0 So rather than witnessing a battle as
to whether the selected prior art was the appropriate prior art starting
point for that particular factual situation ("starting prior art"), we have
seen the battle shift to: (1) Graham Factor 2, i.e., the differences
between the prior art (whose selection is presumed to be correct) and
the claimed invention; and (2) whether those differences rendered the
claimed invention as a whole obvious, with various sub-battles
involving motivation, reasonable expectation of success, teaching
away, etc. As will be discussed below, however, identification of the
proper prior art used to begin an obviousness determination under the
Graham Factors is of the utmost importance because improper
selection of the starting prior art could erroneously lead to the wrong
conclusion, be it obviousness or non-obviousness.
Various options exist for determining an appropriate and sensible
starting prior art during an obviousness analysis. We call this starting
prior art the "Lead Prior Art," to be distinguished from the "Lead
Prior Art" methodology or paradigm discussed throughout this article.
The case law makes clear that the Lead Prior Art may contain one or
more than one piece of prior art; i.e., more than one starting point for
further development.
Of course, as mentioned before,2 5' the burden is on the USPTO
to establish obviousness by a preponderance of the evidence252 and on
the alleged infringer to establish obviousness by clear and convincing
evidence. 2 53 So, practically, the patent applicant/patentee may
NEVER have to establish what is the Lead Prior Art. It may suffice
instead for the patent applicant/patentee to simply establish that the
USPTO and/or the alleged infringer has NOT picked the sensible
prior art starting point.
To initiate the analysis, let us provide a brief historical
perspective discussing how the courts have approached the
determination of obviousness of new chemical compounds before
KSR was decided. We also discuss recent post-KSR Federal Circuit
chemical/pharmaceutical cases that focused their obviousness analysis
249. See, for example, the cases discussed infra Section IVA; see also discussion infra
Section IV.B for a brief review of the exceptions mentioned in the text.
250. See discussion infra Section IV.B for a brief review of the exceptions.
251. See discussion supra Section II.B.
252. See, e.g., Schumer v. Laboratory Computer Sys., Inc., 308 F.3d 1304, 1315 (Fed. Cir.
2002).
253. See id.
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on the identification of compounds that a POSITA would have
selected for further modification ("lead compounds"). We then show
how the lead compound approach can be extrapolated to other
technologies to assert, or defend against, a prima facie case of
obviousness.
A. Determination of Obviousness ofNew Chemical Compounds
Pre-KSR
Before KSR, courts held in chemical cases that sufficient
"structural similarity" between previously-disclosed compounds and
new compounds may, under certain circumstances, form the basis of a
prima facie case of obviousness. 25 4 Those cases required a factually-
intensive analysis of the determination of what constitutes a
"sufficiently similar" compound and the circumstances where such
structural similarity, without more, would have been sufficient to
establish a prima facie case. 25 5 Examples of "particular types or
categories of structural similarity" that apparently, "without more,"
were at least sometimes deemed to result in a prima facie case of
obviousness included steroisomers, adjacent homologs, structural
isomers, and acids and their ethyl esters. 25 6
As the Federal Circuit's en banc decision in Dillon explained,
however, this scenario is more likely to exist where "the claimed and
prior art compounds possess a 'sufficiently close relationship .. . to
create an expectation,' in light of the totality of the prior art, that the
new compound will have 'similar properties' to the old."2 57 Indeed,
Dillon recognized that something else, i.e., a reason or motivation,
beyond structural similarity was required to find obviousness:
This court, in reconsidering this case in banc [sic], reaffirms that
structural similarity between claimed and prior art subject matter,
proved by combining references or otherwise, where the prior art
gives reason or motivation to make the claimed compositions,
creates a primafacie case of obviousness.258
In that case, the "sufficiently close relationship" itself provided the
requisite reason or suggestion to prepare those structurally-related
254. See, e.g., In re Payne, 606 F.2d 303, 314-16 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
255. See, e.g., id.; In re Jones, 958 F.2d 347 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688
(Fed. Cir. 1990).
256. See In re Jones, 958 F.2d 347, 349-50 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (reviewing the existing case
law in this regard up to that date).
257. Aventis Pharma Deutschland GmbH v. Lupin, Ltd., 499 F.3d 1293, 1301 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (citing In re Dillon, 919 F.2d at 692).
258. Dillon, 919 F.2d at 692 (emphasis added).
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compounds because the prior art compounds had a sufficiently
desirable utility for a POSITA to prepare close compounds.25 9
In responding to the dissent, the Dillon majority also presented a
series of scenarios where the closest prior art would not have created
a prima facie case of obviousness. For example, the court explained
that "a presumption is not created when the reference compound is so
lacking in any utility that there is no motivation to make close
relatives." 2 6 0 Nor would there be a prima facie case where the
negative properties of the prior art meant the compound could not be
regarded as useful and therefore could not have been a basis to make
related compounds.26 1
Dillon is also important because it explained that the reason to
modify the prior art compound to arrive at the claimed compounds
need not arise from seeking the same properties displayed by the
claimed compounds:
Properties, therefore, are relevant to the creation of a prima facie
case in the sense of affecting the motivation of a researcher to
make compounds closely related to or suggested by a prior art
compound, but it is not required, as stated in the dissent, that the
prior art disclose or suggest the properties newly-discovered by an
applicant in order for there to be a prima facie case of
obviousness.26 2
Thus, although "properties ... are relevant, failure of the prior art to
disclose or suggest applicant's "newly-discovered" properties does
not preclude the possibility of finding a prima facie case of
obviousness. As long as a sufficiently similar compound has been
previously disclosed as useful for some purpose and, thus, would have
suggested creating the claimed compound, "even if . .. for a reason
entirely separate from the problem faced by the inventor at hand," a
prima facie case of obviousness likely exists against the claimed
compound.263
259. See id. at 692, 696 (explaining that "[i]n brief, the cases establish that if an examiner
considers that he has found prior art close enough to the claimed invention to give one skilled in
the relevant chemical art the motivation to make close relatives (homologs, analogs, isomers,
etc.) of the prior art compound(s), then there arises what has been called a presumption of
obviousness or a primafacie case of obviousness.") (citations omitted).
260. Id. at 697 (citing to In re Stemniski, 444 F.2d 581, 586 (C.C.P.A. 1971)).
261. See Dillon, 919 F.2d at 697 (citing to In re Albrecht, 514 F.2d 1389, 1392 (C.C.P.A.
1975)).
262. Dillon, 919 F.2d at 697
263. Brief for the Respondent in Opposition at 4, Dillon v. Manbeck, No. 90-1264, 1991
WL 11177794, at *6 (U.S. April 10, 1991) ("[T]he principal question considered in the detailed
opinions of the en banc court below: whether the patent examiner establishes a primafacie case
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In more recent times, the first articulation of an obviousness
determination in terms of a "lead compound" analysis occurred pre-
KSR in Yamanouchi v. Danbury.264 That approach took place,
however, because the Federal Circuit decided not to analyze the case
in terms of "lead compounds." Instead, the defendant, Danbury,
rested its obviousness attack on the selection of two "lead
compounds" from the prior art from which it created an alleged
obvious path to the patented compound.2 65 The commercial product in
Yamanouchi was famotidine, an inhibitor of gastric acid secretion
useful in the treatment of heartburn.266
Danbury argued that a POSITA would have selected two known
compounds as lead compounds because they were three and eleven
times more active, respectively, than cimetidine, the benchmark
compound for heartburn treatment at that time. Danbury then
proposed that a POSITA would have combined certain moieties of
those two compounds to create a third, intermediate, compound that
required further modification to arrive at famotidine.268 The Federal
Circuit disagreed with this argument because other compounds were
more active than at least one of the two lead compounds proposed by
Danbury. 269 The court also found that a POSITA would not have
followed the path suggested by Danbury to synthesize famotidine.2 70
Accordingly, the court ruled in favor of the patentee.2 71
Without considering Yamanouchi for the moment, we can
conclude that, in general, in the pre-KSR cases of new chemical
compounds, the courts focused more on (1) whether the differences
between the claimed compounds and the prior art were relatively
small, such that the claimed compound would have been obvious,
and/or (2) whether there would have been a reason to modify the prior
art to arrive at the claimed compounds, even if that was a different
reason than the one the inventor(s) had.2 72 Those cases, however, did
that a composition is obvious by showing motivation to create the composition in the prior art,
even if the prior art would have suggested creating the composition for a reason entirely separate
from the problem faced by the inventor at hand.").
264. Yamanouchi Pharm. Co., v. Danbury Pharm., Inc., 231 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
265. See id. at 1343-44.
266. See id. at 1341.
267. See id at 1344.
268. See id,
269. See id., at 1344-45.
270. See id. at 1345.
271. See id. at 1346.
272. Consider, for example, the rationales supporting the decisions in Jones and Dillon,
which represent typical pre-KSR chemical compound cases. In Jones, the Court held that the
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not focus on whether the selected prior art was the proper art for the
obviousness analysis.
Even in Yamanouchi, the Federal Circuit's analysis was centered
on the then-accepted "motivation to combine" requirement273 and
only referred to "lead compounds" in the opinion because that is how
the defendant articulated its patentability attack.2 74 That position is
confirmed by the fact that in a later pre-KSR new-compound case
involving parties articulating their attacks and defenses in terms of a
"lead compound," the Federal Circuit refused to decide the case on
those terms. 275 Rather, the Federal Circuit held that an analysis of the
applied prior art evidenced a preference for preparation of compounds
different from those claimed; 2 76 and, therefore, the prior art taught
277
away from the claimed invention.
B. Identification of a "Lead Compound" as Part of the
Obviousness Determination ofNew Chemical Compounds
Post-KSR
Based on the pre-KSR case law discussed in the previous section,
a typical approach litigants and USPTO examiners followed during an
obviousness analysis of new chemical compounds involved the
identification of a structurally-close compound in the prior art, and
then a proposal of suitable modifications to arrive at the claimed
compounds. 27 8  The prior art disclosing the structurally-close
compound could be easily identified through hindsight structure-
based searches of publicly available databases using the claimed
compound itself as the search template. 2 79 That approach, clearly
claimed compounds were not obvious because they were not sufficiently close to the applied
prior art. In re Jones, 958 F.2d 347, 350 (Fed. Cir. 1992). In Dillon, the Federal Circuit
concluded that the claimed compounds were obvious because one of ordinary skill in the art
would have had a reason to modify the applied art to arrive at the invention. In re Dillon, 919
F.2d 688, 692 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
273. See Yamanouchi, 231 F.3d at 1345.
274. See id. at 1343-44.
275. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 471 F.3d 1369, 1377-80
(Fed. Cir. 2006).
276. See id. at 1380.
277. See id.
278. See, e.g., In re Jones, 958 F.2d 347,349 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Yamanouchi, 231 F.3d at
1344-45.
279. See The Digital Age - STN, SciFinder, and more, AMERICAN CHEMICAL SOCIETY,
http://portal.acs.org/portallacs/corg/content? nfpb-true&_pageLabel=PPARTICLEMAIN&no
de id-930&content id=CTP_004593&use sec-true&securl-var-regionl&uuid=34bcle59-
6954-470a-8b75-72a87a5174a7#P55 18082 (last visited March 25, 2011) (indicating that STN
International, part of Chemical Abstract Service, has been providing structure-based searches
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loaded with hindsight, did not supply a reason why a POSITA would
have selected a closest compound as a reasonable starting point,
particularly when the POSITA, statutorily,280 would not have had the
benefit of knowing ahead of time the structure of the claimed
compound.
In an attempt to avoid hindsight in the obviousness analysis of
new compound cases post-KSR, the Federal Circuit has, in relatively
recent times, expressly engaged in a determination of whether the
applied prior art was indeed the proper prior art starting point for the
obviousness analysis.281 In those cases, the court has analyzed
whether prior art compounds selected by a party as a POSITA's
starting point, for challenging a patent can be properly considered
"lead compounds," or in Lead Prior Art terminology, "sensible prior
art starting points." A lead compound represents a compound that a
POSITA would have selected as a sensible starting point for further
modification given the knowledge available in the prior art and the
specific circumstances of each case,282 and remembering from en
banc Dillon, that the POSITA might select prior art for a different
reason than that of the inventor(s).283
1. Takeda
To illustrate the concept of the lead compound analysis, consider
the facts of Takeda v. Alphapharm,2 84 which was apparently the first
lead compound case decided after KSR.285 In Takeda, the patented
compounds were useful in the treatment of diabetes and had the
following general structure (claim 1):
since the 1990s).
280. See supra note 4.
281. See, e.g., Takeda Chemical Industries, Ltd. v. Alapharm Pty., Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350,
1356 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Eisai Co. Ltd. v. Dr. Reddy's Laboratories, Ltd., 533 F.3d 1353, 1356-57
(Fed. Cir. 2008); Daiichi Sankyo Co., Ltd. v. Matrix Laboratories, Ltd., 619 F.3d 1346, 1352
(Fed. Cir. 2010).
282. See, e.g., Takeda, 492 F.3d at 1357; Daiichi, 619 F.3d at 1353-54.
283. See discussion supra Section IV.A.
284. See, e.g., Takeda, 492 F.3d at 1357; Eisai, 533 F.3d at 1357.
285. The authors could not identify any other case decided after KSR but before Takeda in
which the Federal Circuit employed the lead compound approach.
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General formula of patented compounds in Takeda28 6
: H5
N CH2CH2-O - / CH2-CH-C=0I I
S NH
\C
II
0
Alphapharm, the accused infringer, argued that the claimed
compounds were obvious in light of a compound known in the prior
art, "Compound b," which has the formula shown below: 28 7
CH3  N CH2CH 2-O - / CH2-CH-C=0
S NH
II
O
Compound b, known in the prior art
Because the structure of the patented compounds allowed the
substitution by the ethyl group (C2H5 -) (circled in the drawing above)
on any available carbon atom in the corresponding ring, the only
difference between the prior art compound, Compound b, and the
genus of claimed compounds was the presence of a methylene group
(-CH 2-) in the circled substituent (the difference between C2 H5 - and
CH 3-). 28 8 The actual commercial embodiment (pioglitazone)
marketed by the patentee was claimed in a dependent claim. 28 9
286. See Takeda, 492 F.3d at 1354.
287. See id
288. See id
289. See id The structure of pioglitazone is shown below.
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Pioglitazone had an additional difference with respect to Compound b
regarding the location of the ethyl group within the pyridyl ring.290
Alphapharm argued that a POSITA would have selected
Compound b as a starting compound for further modification (lead
compound), and that once selected, the POSITA would have made
two obvious changes. 29 1 These changes were (1) replacing the methyl
group with an ethyl group, and then (2) selecting the position of the
ethyl group within the ring to match the position in the commercial
compound pioglitazone.292
Indeed, a comparison of the above structures clearly shows that
the degree of structural similarity between the prior art Compound b
and the patented compound is high. The Federal Circuit, however,
293
after analyzing the relevant prior art, found the claims non-obvious.
Instrumental to the Federal Circuit's decision was a
determination that Compound b, contrary to Alphapharm's assertion,
and despite being undisputedly the most structurally similar
compound to the claimed compounds, would not have been the
compound that a POSITA would have chosen for further modification
when faced with the problem of finding new compounds for the
treatment of diabetes.294 The court determined, instead, when
analyzing the differences between the claimed compounds and the
prior art, that Compound b was not the proper prior art against which
to compare the claimed invention.2 95 It may well have been that
Compound b was within the relevant scope and content of the prior art,
but so were myriad other compounds. And there was no evidence that
Compound b represented a sensible starting point, using our terminology,
for the § 103 calculus.
In order to understand this decision, it is important to recount
some of the relevant prior art that the Federal Circuit considered in its
analysis. Compound b was one of fifty-four explicitly-disclosed
compounds in a prior art patent (U.S. Patent No. 4,287,200, "the '200
CH 5i - aJ
C CH2CH2--O CH2-CH-C=o
S NH
II
Id.
290. Id
291. See id. at 1357.
292. See id.
293. See id. at 1360.
294. See id. at 1358.
295. See id. at 1360.
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patent").2 96 During prosecution of the '200 patent, the applicant
submitted results for nine compounds, one of which was Compound
b.297 In fact, Compound b was specifically claimed in one of the
dependent claims of the '200 patent.298
Also during the prosecution of the '200 patent, the applicant
explicitly singled out Compound b as especially important by stating
that "the compounds in which these heterocyclic rings are substituted
have become important, especially [Compound b]." 2 99 However, a
prior art journal article ("the Sodha II reference") disclosed
undesirable physiological effects of Compound b. 3 00  Those
undesirable side effects included "considerable increases in body
weight and brown fat weight."30' The Sodha II reference also
identified three specific compounds among 101 disclosed compounds
that were deemed to be the most favorable in terms of toxicity and
biological activity.302 Compound b was not among them.303
After weighing the available evidence, the Federal Circuit found
that a POSITA would not have selected Compound b as a lead
compound because of the undesirable side effects.304 The Federal
Circuit explained:
Rather than identify predictable solutions for antidiabetic
treatment, the prior art disclosed a broad selection of compounds
any one of which could have been selected as a lead compound for
further investigation. Significantly, the closest prior art compound
(compound b, the 6-methyl) exhibited negative properties that
would have directed one of ordinary skill in the art away from that
compound.305
In the context of the appeal, the Federal Circuit indicated that a lead
compound was "a compound in the prior art that would be most
promising to modify in order to improve upon its antidiabetic activity
and obtain a compound with better activity." 30 6
Even if Alphapharm had shown that a POSITA would have
selected Compound b as a lead compound, the Federal Circuit also
held that Alphapharm had failed to show that a POSITA would have
296. Id. at 1357.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 1358.
299. Id
300. See id.
301. Id
302. Id.
303. Takeda, 492 F.3d at 1358.
304. See id.
305. Id. at 1359 (emphasis added).
306. Id. at 1357.
2011] 609
610 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 27
modified Compound b in the manner necessary to arrive at the
claimed compound.30 7 Referring to this additional requirement, the
Federal Circuit explained that post-KSR:
[I]n cases involving new chemical compounds, it remains
necessary to identify some reason that would have led a chemist to
modify a known compound in a particular manner to establish
prima facie obviousness of a new compound. 308
As can be seen, the Federal Circuit's analysis in Takeda laid the
foundation for the lead compound approach, and also for our Lead
Prior Art methodology, establishing that mere structural similarity
was not sufficient to establish a prima facie case of obviousness if: (1)
a POSITA would not have selected the close-structural compound
(which was not a sensible prior art starting point in our parlance) or if
(2) a POSITA would not have made the modifications necessary to
arrive at the claimed compound (which would indicate that no
straightforward path could have bridged the differences between the
sensible starting point and the claimed invention with a reasonable
expectation of success).309
As will be seen in Section 5, infra, Lead Prior Art methodology,
therefore, is consistent with Takeda in requiring the party alleging
invalidity to explain why the allegedly invalidating prior art (in
Takeda, not surprisingly, a related structural homolog picked with the
benefit of hindsight) would have been identified as the starting point
for modification. The challenger must establish what desirable
properties the allegedly invalidating prior art has that would have
motivated a POSITA to choose it as a sensible starting point for
further modification. If a POSITA would not have selected the
allegedly invalidating prior art as the sensible starting point for further
investigation, whether or not it is established what other prior art
would in fact have been the sensible starting point, no prima facie
case of obviousness has been established.
Ultimately, nonobviousness may be attributable to a combination
of factors, particularly where there was a failure to establish a linear,
straightforward path for a POSITA from a demonstrably sensible
starting point to the invention. Such inability to factually establish a
sensible starting point, from which a straightforward path existed,
may well explain the difficulty challengers in "lead compound" cases
face in proving obviousness arguments, however logical their
arguments may seem with 20:20 hindsight vision.
307. See id. at 1362-63.
308. Id at 1357.
309. See id at 1356-63.
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2. Eisai
In the second lead compound case decided post-KSR, Eisai Co.
v. Dr. Reddy's Labs,310 the Federal Circuit confirmed the approach
employed in Takeda for the obviousness analysis of a new chemical
compound. The Federal Circuit explicitly articulated the first step of
the analysis: "post-KSR, a prima facie case of obviousness for a
chemical compound still, in general, begins with the reasoned
identification of a lead compound." 11
Eisai is also important because the decision shed light on the
type of prior art that could be considered when searching for a lead
compound. The Federal Circuit explained that although the claimed
compounds were useful in the treatment of ulcers, the obviousness
analysis could also consider compounds inhibiting gastric acid, which
the record showed in that case to be physiologically different from
anti-ulcer compounds. 3 12
Thus, to the extent that a POSITA could have selected those
gastric acid inhibitors as starting compounds for preparation of the
claimed compounds, such prior art inhibitor compounds represented
sensible starting points for obviousness analysis.3 13 In particular,
when considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the
patent challenger, 3 14 the Eisai court assumed that the proposed lead
compounds possessed either superior biological activity to other
known compounds or other characteristics that made them desirable
to a POSITA.315 In essence, the Federal Circuit assumed that the prior
art selected by the patent challenger was indeed within the relevant
scope and content of the prior art in that specific obviousness
determination.
Nonetheless, the court found that a POSITA would not have
modified the selected prior art compounds in the manner proposed by
the patent challenger because such modification would have removed
the very same property that conferred the compounds their advantages
over the other prior art compounds.3 16 Accordingly, the Federal
Circuit held that the claimed compounds would not have been
310. Eisai Co. Ltd. v. Dr. Reddy's Laboratories, Ltd., 533 F.3d 1353, 1357 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
311. Id. at 1359 (emphasis added).
312. See id at 1358 (citing KSR as support for the decision to include compounds
inhibiting gastric acid in the obviousness analysis).
313. See id.
314. See id. at 1355 (Eisai dealt with a review of a district court decision granting the
patentee's summary judgment motion of validity and enforceability in favor of the patentee.); id.
at 1356, 1358 (When deciding a summary judgment motion, the court takes the evidence in the
light most favorable to the non-movant party.).
315. See id. at 1358.
316. See id. at 1358-59.
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obvious to a POSITA in light of the prior art. 1  In other words, there
was no straightforward path from those selected prior art compounds
to the claimed invention and, hence, no obviousness.
The approach followed in Eisai, considering prior art useful in
solving a problem different from that of the inventors', is also
consistent with the Federal Circuit en banc Dillon 3 8 decision and
with KSR. 19 As explained infra,320 the Dillon court refused to
institute the requirement that a prima facie case of obviousness
required an expectation that the proposed combination of prior art
references would have the same utility as the claimed compounds.32 1
Although the court's statements in Dillon were directed to the reasons
a POSITA could have had when combining the references,3 22 the
statements nonetheless demonstrate a willingness to consider prior art
that evidences a utility different from that of the claimed invention.
3. Daichi
The next lead compound case from the Federal Circuit is Daiichi
Sankyo Co., Ltd. v. Matrix Labs.32 3 In Daiichi, the Federal Circuit
reiterated and confirmed the requirements of the lead compound
approach by explaining that:
Proof of obviousness based on structural similarity requires clear
and convincing evidence that a medicinal chemist of ordinary skill
would have been motivated [1] to select and then [2] to modify a
prior art compound (e.g., a lead compound) to arrive at a claimed
compound with a reasonable expectation that the new compound
would have similar or improved properties compared with the old.
In keeping with the flexible nature of the inquiry after [KSR], the
motivation to select and modify a lead compound need not be
explicit in the art. 324
More importantly, the Federal Circuit also provided further
guidance on how to implement the lead compound approach. For
example, the court named factors helpful in identifying potential lead
317. See id at 1359.
318. In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 697 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
319. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420 (explaining that "[t]he
question is not whether the combination was obvious to the patentee but whether the
combination was obvious to a person with ordinary skill in the art" and that "[u]nder the correct
analysis, any need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of invention and
addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining the elements in the manner
claimed.").
320. See supra text accompanying notes 254-277.
321. See Dillon, 919 F.2d at 693.
322. See supra text accompanying notes 254-277.
323. Daiichi Sankyo Co., Ltd. v. Matrix Labs, 619 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
324. Id. at 1352 (citations omitted).
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compounds: "it is the possession of promising useful properties in a
lead compound that motivates a chemist to make structurally similar
compounds."32 5 The court also blamed hindsight for the improper
selection of structurally-close lead compounds and provided a
foundation for a forward-looking approach to select a lead compound:
Yet the attribution of a compound as a lead compound after the
fact must avoid hindsight bias; it must look at the state of the art at
the time the invention was made to find a motivation to select and
then modify a lead compound to arrive at the claimed invention.
Accordingly, proving a reason to select a compound as a lead
compound depends on more than just structural similarity, but also
knowledge in the art of the functional properties and limitations of
the prior art compounds. Potent and promising activity in the prior
art trumps mere structural relationships. 326
Thus, Daiichi not only confirmed the applicability of the lead
compound approach to the analysis of new chemical compounds, but
also provided further guidance on how to implement the approach.
Further details of the facts involved in Daiichi are presented below in
Section D, where the details illustrate how the scope of the search for
prior art under Graham Factor 1 could influence the prima facie
obviousness analysis.
4. Ortho-McNeil
Ortho-McNeil v Mylan, 32 7 a case involving the epilepsy drug
TOPO-MAX6, is also instructive because, as the court noted, "[i]n
retrospect, [the inventor's] pathway to the invention, of course, seems
to follow the logical steps to produce these properties, but at the time
of invention, the inventor's insights, willingness to confront and
overcome obstacles, and yes, even serendipity, cannot be
discounted."3 28 In other words, Mylan, the challenger, was not able to
provide a clear and convincing reason why a POSITA would have
had a reason to follow a straightforward path from Mylan's proposed
starting point in the prior art, an intermediate, to the claimed
invention.
The failure was even broader, as Mylan also failed to establish
why a POSITA would have started with the prior art compound they
selected. 3 29 And, "[e]ven beyond that, the ordinary artisan in this field
325. Id. at 1354.
326. Id. (citations omitted, second emphasis added).
327. Ortho-McNeil Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 520 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
328. Id. at 1364.
329. See id.
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would have had to (at the time of invention without any clue of
potential utility of topiramate) stop at that intermediate and test it for
properties far afield from the purpose for the development in the first
place (epilepsy rather than diabetes)."330
Because no such rationale was offered, the court concluded that
Mylan "simply retraced the path of the inventor with hindsight,
discounted the number and complexity of the alternatives, and
concluded that the invention of topiramate was obvious."3 ' In Lead
Prior Art terms, Mylan failed to establish that its proposed prior art
starting point was sensible. That failure was also dispositive, because
if one starts at a wrong prior art starting point, it is hard to envision a
straightforward path between that ill-considered prior art choice and
the claimed invention. Of course, wholly apart from the Lead Prior
Art paradigm, such flawed reasoning should rarely, if ever, be
successful, for establishing obviousness, particularly in view of the
language of Title 35 that requires the analysis to examine "the subject
matter as a whole" to ascertain if it "would have been obvious at the
time the invention was made." 332
C. Extrapolation of the "Lead Compound" Approach to All
Technologies to Identif the Proper Lead Prior Art Used in a
Prima Facie Obviousness Determination
As mentioned previously, 333 to avoid the use of impermissible
hindsight, a prima facie obviousness analysis should proceed without
considering the claimed invention and should only take into account
the knowledge available in the art before the invention was made.
Below, we propose our Lead Prior Art methodology, introduced
earlier in the article, to identify suitable prior art to be used as part of
Graham Factor 2 when determining whether a prima facie case of
obviousness exists. This proposed methodology attempts to minimize
the use of hindsight when making an obviousness determination by
focusing on a forward-looking view of only information that would
have been properly available to a POSITA.
The initial step in an obviousness assessment, according to
Graham Factor 1, consists of reviewing the available art,3 34 which
should consist of that information that was available at the time of the
invention, to avoid use of hindsight.3 The purpose of that review is
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. See supra note 4.
333. See discussion supra Section II.C.
334. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1965).
335. See supra note 4.
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to identify sensible starting points in the prior art. Our proposed
methodology, however, allows for one notable exception because it
also permits the inclusion of other objective indicia of
nonobviousness that might have been developed after the invention
was made (commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure
of others, unexpected results, etc.)336 This approach, however, is
entirely consistent with existing Federal Circuit precedent 337 and with
the USPTO's own guidelines for examination, 33 8 which indicate that
such objective indicia of nonobviousness could aid in a determination
of whether a prima facie case of obviousness exists. 33 9
That initial review of the art seeks to identify any prior art that
would have been available that a POSITA would have considered
relevant to solve a problem for which the claimed invention is also the
solution, whether or not that problem was the same problem the
applicant or patentee was trying to solve.340
Although knowledge of the claimed invention may seem to
suggest an element of hindsight in application of our methodology,
any use of hindsight is merely an analytical expedient that should not
affect the accuracy of the results reached by our methodology. The
logical justification for this statement relies, however, on some
advanced concepts whose foundation has not yet been properly laid.
Therefore, the authors ask that the reader take this statement as true
until a subsequent discussion, infra.341
The Lead Prior Art methodology then demands that the most
sensible starting point(s) be chosen, which will not necessarily be the
most similar structurally. The Lead Prior Art paradigm seems superior
to a hindsight search-selecting the most structurally similar
compound and then applying it as the closest prior art with no
investigation if other less structurally similar compounds are in fact
more sensible starting points.
As mentioned previously, the POSITA represents a hypothetical
person who: (1) is presumed to be aware of all the pertinent prior art
in the area of the invention, (2) possesses ordinary creativity, and
336. See discussion supra Section II.A.1.d. That evidence is not part of the scope and
content of the prior art. But it goes to the level of skill in the art and the import of differences
between the prior art and the claimed invention, i.e. Graham Factors I and 2. See discussion
supra Section II.A.
337. See, e.g., Siemens Med. Solutions USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics & Plastics,
Inc., Nos. 2010-1145, 2010-1177, 2011 WL 651790 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
338. 2010 KSR Guidelines Update, supra note 81 at 53,657 § 5.
339. See discussion supra Sections II.A. .d and II.B.
340. See discussion supra Section IV.A.
341. See discussion infra Section V.E.
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(3) exercises common sense when analyzing the available knowledge
in the art. 342
Although selection of a starting point based on solutions to a
similar problem may facially appear similar to traditional principles
of analogous art,343 important differences exist. Principally, precedent
concerning what prior art constitutes analogous art for existing
obviousness rubric determines how broad the scope and content of
prior art under consideration should be, for purposes of including as
much prior art as possible within the obviousness consideration. By
contrast, however, selection of a sensible starting point in the prior art
concerns narrowing the prior art to that of a solution to the most
similar problem, to assist in identifying a starting point that would
presumably require fewer minimum modifications to reach the
claimed invention. Thus, the inquiries for analogous art and
identifying a sensible starting point are related but not identical. In
fact, under the Lead Prior Art methodology, sensible starting point
will always be analogous prior art but analogous prior art will not
always be a sensible starting point.
The prior art analyzed in the initial step mentioned above for the
Lead Prior Art methodology represents the pool of knowledge from
which one or more starting prior art documents will be selected
during the analysis involving Graham Factor 2 (differences between
the prior art and the claimed invention). It is this sensible piece(s) of
starting point prior art that makes up the "Lead Prior Art," to then be
analyzed in the Lead Prior Art methodology.
1. Identification of the Proper Lead Prior Art
Identification of that Lead Prior Art will be the focus of this
section of the article. The legal framework for this analysis is founded
on the rationale behind the Federal Circuit decisions in the lead
compound cases discussed above. 34 4
If a review of the available prior art according to Graham Factor
1 yields the existence of a problem that requires a solution, the
analysis proceeds to determine whether the art also provides one or
more of those needed solutions. Indeed, as part of the analysis of the
"obvious to try" approach,345 the Supreme Court indicated that
"[w]hen there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem
and there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a
342. See discussion supra Section II.A.
343. See discussion supra Section H.A.I.a.
344. See discussion supra Section IV.B.
345. See discussion supra Section I.A.2.
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person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known options
within his or her technical grasp."3 46
The above passage is most commonly understood as providing a
rationale to reach a conclusion that a given invention was obvious
when a limited number of solutions were available to a known
problem and the inventor merely pursued one of those solutions with
a reasonable expectation of success. However, the passage also
provides guidance for selecting a proper starting point for an
obviousness analysis from among the available prior art. If the
claimed invention is among a few, easily traversed, identified, and
predictable solutions flowing from the prior art starting point, it is
more likely that a prima facie case of obviousness exists. 3 47
Hence, identified proposals in the art to solve a specified need
can also be the source of suitable starting prior art for an obviousness
analysis. Of course, among those identified proposals may be one or
more that is more promising than the next. As in the Lead Compound
cases, those one or more then may be the sensible prior art starting
point(s).
If, alternatively, the prior art provides no solution to the
aforementioned need, the next step in our proposed methodology
identifies information that a POSITA would have considered relevant
to find a solution to that need. As the line of chemical cases discussed
previously dealing with the patentability of new chemical compounds
348reeati
suggests, relevant information could be obtained by analyzing the
available options that a POSITA could have followed for further
innovation to solve the problem. In the new-chemical compound
field, for example, prior art compounds that possess "promising
useful properties ... that motivate[] a chemist to make structurally
similar compounds"34 9 are considered suitable lead compounds.5 o
And similarly, those like Compound b in the Takeda case, discussed
supra, that possess undesirable properties may end up not being
sensible prior art starting points. As further seen in Takeda, that
consideration can be a deciding factor in determining obviousness.
Thus, in analogy with the lead compound cases, our Lead Prior
Art methodology for identifying the Lead Prior Art proposes the
selection of prior art that discloses promising options to solve any
problem for which the claimed invention could potentially be a
346. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007).
347. See id.
348. See discussion supra Section IV.B.
349. Daiichi Sankyo Co., Ltd., v. Matrix Labs., Ltd., 619 F.3d 1346, 1354 (Fed. Cir.
2010).
350. See id.
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solution. If only one possible starting solution is available to a
POSITA, then such starting point could be considered the Lead Prior
Art, unless, of course, that very solution is fraught with at least one
factor precluding its selection as starting point.
However, if more than one possible prior art starting point exists,
and if they all fail to possess some significant negative, then it would
be necessary, in determining the sensible prior art starting point(s), to
review all available prior art and consider whether there is
information that either (1) identifies one or more potential starting
points as more promising than others or (2) teaches away from
particular approaches.
Examples of information that could point towards potential
sensible starting points include information that evidences that a
starting point: (1) displays some kind of superior performance over
other starting points, 35 1 (2) possesses desirable characteristics not
present in other starting points,352 (3) highlights the availability of
more information about a particular starting point that would make
the development of an improved solution easier than from other
starting points,353 and (4) lacks undesirable features or characteristics
present in other starting points. 5 Needless to say, this is a non-
exhaustive list of potential circumstances that could tilt the balance
towards particular starting points while disfavoring others. In general,
any information properly available to a POSITA that is capable of
elevating the desirability of one or more potential starting points over
others is relevant to the identification of the Lead Prior Art.
Under those considerations, it becomes apparent why the
"structurally closest" prior art355 might not necessarily be the proper
Lead Prior Art. For instance, there could be information in the art that
could have dissuaded a POSITA from having selected that closest
prior art, in favor of other more desirable references. For example, as
mentioned above in Takeda, the Federal Circuit determined that a
351. See, e.g., Daiichi, 619 F.3d at 1351 (explaining that higher potency is an acceptable
reason to select lead compounds).
352. See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(explaining that solubility and bioavailability are acceptable reasons to select suitable anions for
salt formation).
353. See, e.g., Daiichi, 619 F.3d at 1353-54 (explaining that a POSITA would have
selected the proper lead compounds, inter alia, because they were "better-studied" than the
compounds proposed by the patent challenger).
354. See, e.g., Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350, 1358
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (finding that undesirable side effect would have dissuaded a POSITA from
selecting a particular compound as a lead compound); Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex Inc., 550
F.3d 1075, 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (suggesting that the absence of toxicity in a compound is
desirable).
355. The structurally closest prior art is generally understood to be that which possesses
the least number of differences with the claimed invention. See, e.g., Daiichi, 619 F.3d at 1354.
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POSITA would not have selected the Compound b that was
structurally closest to the claimed compound for further modification
because of its undesirable physiological side effects. 35 6
We posit that even the level of unpredictability in the art and the
degree of expectation of success associated with some of the starting
points available to a POSITA should be considered in the
determination of the Lead Prior Art. Although unpredictability and
expectation of success are normally considered in an obviousness
analysis at stages subsequent to the selection of the proper prior art,357
they could be nonetheless relevant to a POSITA in the selection of a
suitable starting point against a backdrop of particularized facts. For
example, if a POSITA considers that the results from the steps
required to modify a given starting point are unpredictable or lack an
expectation of success, then the POSITA would be more likely to
disfavor that non-straightforward option and instead pursue other
more predictable or promising starting points.
Also, as mentioned previously, 3 59 while objective indicia of
nonobviousness (commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs,
failure of others, unexpected results, etc.) 3 60 are commonly viewed as
evidence used to rebut a prima facie case of obviousness, they
nonetheless could provide an indication of whether a prima facie case
of obviousness has even been established.3 61 To the extent that
evidence from those objective indicia of nonobviousness suggests that
a certain potential starting point would not have been selected by a
POSITA, that evidence is relevant to the determination of the Lead
Prior Art.
For instance, evidence that a particular starting point has been
tried unsuccessfully in the past would tend to indicate that such a
starting point would not have been chosen again by a POSITA.
Similarly, if evidence shows that the results obtained from following
a particular starting point are unexpectedly as good as, or even
superior to, results obtained from other starting points, then the
356. See Takeda, 492 F.3d at 1359-60.
357. See discussion supra Section II.A.
358. See discussion supra Section II.A.
359. See discussion supra Section II.A.
360. See discussion supra Section II.A.
361. See Geo M. Martin Co. v. Alliance Machine Systems Int'l. LLC, 618 F.3d 1294, 1304
("Secondary considerations of nonobviousness must be considered when present."); Vandenberg
v. Dairy Equip. Co., 740 F.2d 1560, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("In determining the question of
obviousness, inquiry should always be made into whatever objective evidence of
nonobviousness there may be. The so-called 'secondary considerations' can often prevent a
court from slipping into an impermissible hindsight analysis. They should be considered as a
fourth factual inquiry under Graham before coming to a conclusion concerning obviousness.")
(citations omitted).
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evidence could show that a POSITA, absent knowledge of those later-
revealed unexpected results, could well have selected those other
starting points that a priori suggested a better outcome. Also, if the art
had identified a pressing need for which a solution had not been
provided, then the development of a solution to that need could
suggest that a POSITA could well not have selected options that had
been available in the art for some time as the starting points and/or the
paths followed from that starting point to the claimed invention.
Simply put, those options/paths had not been used to solve the
problem previously, so why rely on them now?
The discussion of the scenarios in the previous paragraphs makes
it clear that any information tending to show that a given prior art
starting point is better or worse than any other potential starting point
can be used to identify the Lead Prior Art. Once all available
information has been analyzed and one or more potential starting
points have been recognized, the evidence is assessed to determine
which of those potential starting points would have been chosen by a
POSITA. The resulting starting points constitute the Lead Prior Art to
be compared with the claimed invention according to Graham Factor
2.
In this regard, it is important to keep in mind that the
identification of the Lead Prior Art is most relevant to the
determination of whether a prima facie case of obviousness exists.
Even if a prima facie case is present, the applicant or patentee can still
present evidence to rebut it in the form of any of the objective indicia
of nonobviousness mentioned previously.362 But as also discussed
previously, a more sure position is to defeat, rather than rebut, a prima
facie case of obviousness.6
In summary, our proposed Lead Prior Art methodology to
identify the Lead Prior Art is not constrained to any particular field of
endeavor and can be applied across all technologies. Our proposed
methodology requires that all relevant information available, that
could have a bearing on the overall desirability of certain prior art
starting points, should be considered. All of the available relevant
evidence is sifted to determine whether a POSITA would have
selected one or more particular pieces of prior art as a sensible
starting point(s) for further innovative modification.
362. See discussion supra Section II.A.
363. See discussion supra Section ILB.
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D. The Scope of the Problem Analyzed Could Impact the
Selection of the Lead Prior Art
The decision-maker faced with tasks of determining the "scope
and content of the prior art" under Graham Factor 1364 needs to
decide how broad the scope of the inquiry needs to be to identify the
sensible prior art starting points.
There are two possible outcomes of changing the scope of the
search of the prior art under Graham Factor 1. Under a first scenario,
if the scope is too broad, the number of available starting solutions in
the prior art to the problem at hand can be potentially quite large. This
situation may lead to a higher probability that one or more of those
starting points will represent an attractive alternative that appears
superior to the rest of the alternatives and that, when pursued, would
lead away from the claimed invention. Still under the first scenario, if
the scope of the inquiry is too narrow, the number of available
starting solutions in the prior art might be reduced, potentially leading
to a situation where the only reasonable prior art solution is one that
naturally leads to the claimed invention. Thus, under the first
scenario, broadening the search for prior art in the Lead Prior Art
methodology could actually lead to a determination that the invention
is not prima facie obvious, while narrowing the search in that
methodology could lead to a determination that the invention is prima
facie obvious.
But it is not quite that simple. Under a second scenario, it is also
possible that narrowing the scope of the inquiry could lead to no
viable starting points that a POSITA could pursue. In this case, there
would not be a reasonable piece of Lead Prior Art available to a
POSITA; accordingly, the invention is not prima facie obvious.
Conversely, still under the second scenario, broadening the scope of
the search could yield various potential starting points. If one of those
starting points would naturally lead to the invention based on
suggestions available in the prior art, then the invention could be
found to be prima facie obvious.
The different outcomes of the two scenarios described above
illustrate that varying the scope of the search of prior art during
Graham Factor 1 could influence the type and number of references
available as Lead Prior Art. It is evident that the type of scenario
encountered in a real-life situation, either the first or second scenarios
above, would be very fact-specific and, consequently, the outcome
would vary with the facts of each case.
364. See discussion supra Section II.A. .a.
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We will draw on the facts of the Daiichi case, which was
previously discussed,36 5 to illustrate the first scenario described above
and demonstrate how narrowing or broadening the scope of the search
for prior art under Graham Factor 1 could affect the obviousness
analysis. In Daiichi, the Federal Circuit rejected the compound
chosen by the patent challenger, Mylan, as the lead compound,
despite it being the most structurally similar compound to the claimed
compound.366 That decision rested in part on the fact that there were
other prior art compounds displaying higher potency, which had been
better studied than the compounds proposed by Mylan.367
In Daiichi, the claimed compound was an angiotensin receptor
blocker ("ARB") useful in the treatment of high blood pressure.368
The only issue in Daiichi was whether claim 13 was valid.3 69 Claim
13 claimed Olmesartan medoxomil, which has the following chemical
formula: 37 0
CH3
CH3
3 4 CH20H
H7C3 2, 5 O0
0o
N N medoxomil group
NH
Olmesartan medoxomil37 1
365. See discussion in Section Il.B.
366. See Daiichi Sankyo Co., Ltd. v. Matrix Laboratories, Ltd., 619 F.3d 1346, 1353-54
(Fed. Cir. 2010).
367. See id. at 1354.
368. See id at 1347.
369. See id. at l351.
370. See id. at 1350.
371. Id.
LEAD PRIOR ART METHODOLOGY
CH 3
CH3
CH 3
N
H7C3  N
0
NN
NH
N
Example 6 from U.S. Patent No. 5,137,902 (prior art)372
For comparison, the structurally-closest compound from the
prior art (Example 6 from U.S. Patent No. 5,137,902 ("the '902
patent")) is also shown above and the differences between the two
compounds are highlighted.3 73 From the drawings, it can be seen that
the only differences between the two compounds are two substituents
in the imidazole ring, whose atoms are numbered from I to 5 in
olmesartan medoxomil.
As can also be seen, the substituent on carbon atom 4 in
olmesartan medoxomil has a hydroxymethyl group (-CH 20H),
whereas the prior art compound has a methyl group (-CH 3) in the
corresponding position (circled). The other difference is the presence
of the medoxomil pro-drug masking a carboxylic acid in olmesartan
medoxomil, whereas the prior art compound has the unmasked
carboxylic group in the corresponding position. It was known in the
art, however, that the medoxomil pro-drug improved oral absorption
and that it is metabolized in the body to liberate the carboxylic group,
as it is present in the prior art compound.3 74
372. Id. at 1351.
373. See id.
374. See id. at 1350.
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Regardless of the differences in the two substituents, both
compounds have the same core structure, which is an imidazole ring
containing a biphenyltetrazole substituent at position 1.3 75 In addition
to Example 6, Mylan argued that five other compounds disclosed in
the '902 patent had properties that would have made them lead
compounds.376
According to Mylan, the compounds from the '902 patent were
already second-generation ARB compounds that improved on the
potency and physiological behavior of the compounds taught in U.S.
Patent No. 5,138,069 ("the '069 patent"). 7 The '069 patent included
Losartan, the first orally-active ARB compound.3 Losartan later
became the reference standard against which potency of later-
developed ARB compounds was measured.379
The court approached the issue of finding the lead compound for
the obviousness analysis by determining the type of compounds that a
POSITA would have chosen to prepare new ARB compounds.380 As
mentioned previously, 3 8 1 the court rejected Mylan's choice of lead
compounds, including Example 6 from the '902 patent. The court
reasoned that there were other, more potent and better studied, prior
art ARB compounds that would have been selected by a POSITA for
further development over the compounds from the '902 patent.3 82
From the four compounds that the court indicated would have
been selected for further development as lead compounds, the two
most potent had 180 and 100 times the potency of the first-generation
Losartan.383 Those two compounds did not have the same core
structure as compounds in the '902 patent or olmesartan
medoxomil. 3 84 From among the four court-selected lead compounds,
the only compound that had the same core structure as olmesartan
medoxomil had a potency of only about seven times that of the
reference Losartan. 385 The compounds of the '902 patent advanced by
Mylan as lead compounds had an activity approximately "2 to 4 fold
higher than the most active compounds [of the '069 patent, which
disclosed Losartan]."386
375. Id. at 1349.
376. See id. at 1352-53.
377. See id. at 1353.
378. See Daiichi, 619 F.3d at 1348-49.
379. See id at 1353.
380. See id.
381. See supra note 326.
382. See id. at 1353.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 1351.
385. Id. at 1353.
386. Id. at 1353-55.
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With that background, had the court chosen to frame the search
for the lead compound in terms of a POSITA searching for an
improved Losartan molecule (i.e. one having an imidazole ring
containing a biphenyltetrazole substituent as core), all but one of the
original lead compounds would have been eliminated from the pool.
Under those circumstances, arguably, the court could have had a
harder time justifying the selection of the one remaining prior art
compound from the four as lead compound, especially because the
compounds of the '902 patent were said to "exhibit[] remarkable and
unexpected potency as antihypertensives." 387  However, by
broadening the search and framing it in terms of seeking new ARB's
in general, other more potent compounds were brought into the pool
of leading compounds.38 8
Nonetheless, it is unclear whether the outcome in Daiichi would
have been any different. In its decision, the Federal Circuit indicated
that, even if the compounds from the '902 patent had been selected as
lead compounds, Mylan failed to articulate a reason why a POSITA
would have modified them in the manner required to arrive at
olmesartan medoxomil.3 89 In other words, Mylan, in terms of the
Lead Prior Art methodology, failed to show that there was a
straightforward pathway from their choice of lead compound to the
claimed invention, let alone a reasonable expectation of success.
Nonetheless, this scenario illustrates how the scope of the search for
prior art could potentially influence the outcome of a prima facie
obviousness analysis.
In summary, selection of a Lead Prior Art is the first of two steps
for applying our methodology during an obviousness determination.
Discussion of the Lead Prior Art selection step began with a legal and
logical foundation for the concept of a Lead Prior Art, based on
analyzing lead compound cases pre-KSR and post-KSR. From that
analysis, an extrapolation of lead compound case law has been
proposed, such that the concepts underlying lead compound case law
could be applied to all technologies to identify a Lead Prior Art for
further obviousness analysis. The preceding discussion concluded by
discussing how the scope and content of the prior art could have a
significant effect on Lead Prior Art selection.
Once that Lead Prior Art was selected, however, the second of
two steps for our methodology would follow-identifying and
evaluating one or more modifications to the Lead Prior Art to allow
387. Id. at 1353.
388. See id.
389. See id at 1356-57.
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for a conclusion of nonobviousness or prima facie obviousness. A
discussion of that second step follows.
V. IDENTIFICATION AND EVALUATION OF MODIFICATIONS TO THE
LEAD PRIOR ART TO DETERMINE NONOBVIOUSNESS OR PRIMA
FACIE OBVIOUSNESS
A. Identifying a Straightforward Modification to the Starting
Point
After the POSITA had identified a piece(s) of Lead Prior Art
(and we have seen in examples above that such identification can be
outcome determinative), the POSITA would have attempted to
ascertain whether the Lead Prior Art was a starting point that would
have allowed the POSITA to reach the solution to the POSITA's
problem in a straightforward way with a reasonable expectation of
success. The POSITA would have faced two possible scenarios at this
point. First, the claimed invention could have read directly on to the
starting point. In this scenario, the Lead Prior Art was a complete
solution to the POSITA's problem. That situation, however, also
represents an issue of anticipation under § 102 rather than
obviousness under § 103. Therefore, we set aside that possibility for
purposes of our obviousness analysis.
Second, the claimed invention may not have read directly on to
the starting point, so the POSITA would have faced the question of
whether any apparent, straightforward "modifications" would have
allowed the POSITA to reach the solution with a reasonable
expectation of success. That scenario requires our discussion to
consider what a "modification" is in the context of Lead Prior Art.
A "modification" represents a change that a POSITA would have
considered making to a starting point, based on the POSITA having a
reason to think the modification was straightforward and could have
reasonably been expected to lead successfully to reaching the
solution. Recall that a starting point and a solution both have
properties. The starting point may possess some of the properties that
the solution possesses, but may also omit at least some of the
properties possessed by the solution, setting aside, as above, the § 102
scenario as discussed above.
Faced with a starting point that does not possess all the desired
properties to the solution, the POSITA would have considered what
straightforward modifications the POSITA could make to the starting
point to potentially achieve, with a reasonable expectation of success,
the solution sought by the POSITA. Functionally, a modification may
add certain desirable properties to a starting point or may remove
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undesirable properties from that starting point, or may even create a
potential for properties to be added to or removed from the starting
point through a subsequent modification. Removing undesirable
properties that were not present in the claimed invention might be a
necessary predicate to adding desirable properties to the sensible
starting point, so this possibility is mentioned in passing. Ultimately,
the POSITA would have determined which modifications were
available to it by considering various modifications to the starting
point that might have led to the solution, whether through direct or
indirect means.
A modification in the context of Lead Prior Art corresponds to
combinations of references or modifications to a primary prior art
reference in an existing obviousness rubric. These modifications are
selected based on teachings or suggestions in the prior art or by an
exercise of ordinary creativity or common sense by a POSITA.
Therefore, the nature of and the likelihood of success from potential
modifications may range from "known elements achieving
predictable results" 90 to "unexpected results,"39  depending on the
circumstances. Due to the range of certainties present in different
factual situations, the discussion that follows refers to modifications
as offering a reasonable possibility of reaching the solution, rather
than certainty of reaching the solution.
Considering obviousness from the perspective of an inventor
going through a multi-step inventive process is not entirely new as the
following Federal Circuit quotation demonstrates:
The record. . . shows that even if an ordinarily skilled artisan
sought an FBPase inhibitor, that person would not have chosen
topiramate.... In this case, the record shows that a person of
ordinary skill would not even be likely to start with 2,3:4,5 di-
isopropylidene fructose (DPF), as Dr. Maryanoff did. Beyond that
step, however, the ordinarily skilled artisan would have to have
some reason to select (among several unpredictable alternatives)
the exact route that produced topiramate as an intermediate. Even
beyond that, the ordinary artisan in this field would have had to (at
the time of invention without any clue of potential utility of
topiramate) stop at that intermediate and test it for properties far
afield from the purpose for the development in the first place
(epilepsy rather than diabetes). 392
390. See discussion supra Section II.A.2.
391. See discussion supra Section II.A.I.d.
392. Ortho-McNeil Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. Mylan Labs, Inc., 520 F.3d 1358, 1364 (Fed.
Cir. 2008).
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Although the likelihood of success from various modifications may
range from expected to unexpected, as discussed above, the POSITA
would not have considered all such options. Instead, the POSITA
would have limited consideration to those modifications that the
POSITA had reason to think possessed a reasonable likelihood of
reaching a solution to the POSITA's problem, based on the POSITA's
perfect knowledge of the prior art (and suggestions therein), common
sense, and ordinary creativity. 39 3 Thus, only "straightforward
modifications" would have been considered by the POSITA. The
notion of "straightforward modifications," as a practical limit on what
options the POSITA would have considered after selecting a sensible
starting point, parallels the logic and process of selecting a Lead Prior
Art starting point3 94 and thus applies those principles discussed above,
in the context of selecting a starting point, to the concept of
identifying which straightforward modifications a POSITA would
have considered.
B. Testing Modified Starting Points and Iterating as Needed
Once a straightforward modification had been identified by the
POSITA, the POSITA would have evaluated the straightforward
modification's ability and potential to solve the POSITA's problem. If
the straightforward modification would have been able to solve the
POSITA's problem, it could thus render the claims prima facie
obvious, as long as the straightforward modification would have a
reasonable expectation of success for solving the POSITA's problem;
i.e., the claims would read directly on the modified starting point. In
effect, that straightforward modification would have bridged the
conceptual gap between a starting point (the Lead Prior Art) and the
claimed invention. The implications of the POSITA having had the
capacity to identify such a solution are discussed infra.395
In another example, a straightforward modification would have
had the reasonable potential to solve the POSITA's problem when
two conditions existed: first, the straightforward modification would
have created a modified starting point that the claimed invention did
not read directly on. Second, the POSITA would have nonetheless
had a reason to believe that one or more additional straightforward
modifications to the modified starting point might have reasonably
led to a further-modified starting point that the claimed invention
would have read on. In our methodology, evaluating the potential of
393. See discussion supra Section II.A.
394. See discussion supra Section IV.
395. See discussion infra Section V.C.
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multiple straightforward modifications to achieve the claimed
invention corresponds to combining multiple prior art reference
teachings or suggestions, as well as inferences from common sense
and ordinary creativity. If the POSITA could have traversed from a
Lead Prior Art starting point to the solution through one or more
straightforward modifications with a reasonable expectation of
success, the Lead Prior Art starting point would have been viable for
the POSITA. The implications of the POSITA having reached a
solution are discussed infra.3 96
If, however, the POSITA could not have traversed from the Lead
Prior Art starting point to the solution through any available
straightforward modifications, be they one or more, the Lead Prior
Art starting point would not have been a viable starting point for the
POSITA. The POSITA, in that situation, would have attempted to
traverse from another Lead Prior Art starting point to the solution, if
another Lead Prior Art starting point would have been available to the
POSITA. And so on the POSITA would have continued attempting
traversal from various available starting points modified through all
straightforward modifications associated with each starting point until
the solution had been reached or until all other starting points and
associated straightforward modifications had been exhausted. Upon
exhausting the available starting points and associated straightforward
modifications, the POSITA would have discontinued its investigation,
because no means for reaching the solution would have been available
from any starting point the POSITA would have considered. The
implications of the POSITA having had the ability to reach the
solution or not having had that ability are discussed next.
C. Nonobviousness or Prima Facie Obviousness Based on the
POSITA Reaching or Not Reaching the Solution
At this point in the Lead Prior Art analysis, the POSITA would
have either determined that the POSITA could have straightforwardly
traversed from a starting point to the solution with a reasonable
expectation of success, or the POSITA would have determined that no
starting point would have been available and apparent to the POSITA
that would have allowed traversing to the solution with a reasonable
expectation of success. Each condition tends to support an opposite
conclusion of obviousness or nonobviousness, so each is discussed
accordingly.
Once the POSITA had exhausted all Lead Prior Art starting
points, including all straightforward modifications thereto, the
396. See discussion infra Section V.C.
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POSITA would have been left with no options for further
investigation. This situation in the Lead Prior Art framework
corresponds to shortcomings in the prior art that cannot be overcome
by a proponent of obviousness; unless additional prior art is later
identified, a conclusion of nonobviousness must follow because the
proponent has failed to even establish a prima facie case of
obviousness. This conclusion is fully warranted under the Lead Prior
Art analysis above and is completely consistent with elementary
principles of patent law. That conclusion is also consistent with the
results in Yamanouchi, Takeda, Esiai, and Ortho-McNeill, discussed
supra.m
Conventional determinations of nonobviousness do not preclude
the possibility that other art could exist somewhere that would render
the claimed invention obvious; practical experience suggests that such
is often the case. In atypical factual circumstances, however, where
all starting points and all straightforward modifications could be
exhaustively considered (i.e., where all prior art and suggestions
therein, as well as all inferences from those references, common
sense, and ordinary creativity are known and considered), a
conclusion of nonobviousness per se would be logically appropriate if
a Lead Prior Art could not be identified that could have led to the
claimed invention even under such perfect circumstances. This
conclusion would correspond to a full and accurate knowledge of all
prior art coupled with a clear and unmistakable but likely idealistic
conclusion that "no missing art" existed somewhere but had not yet
been identified. Only under those incredibly unlikely circumstances
would no solution have been possible under any circumstances by the
POSITA. Thus, the authors speculate that conclusions of
"nonobviousness per se" may arise rarely or as a pedagogical notion
that may never exist in practice.
If, however, the POSITA would have identified one or more
Lead Prior Art starting points that could have been modified in a
straightforward way to reach the solution with a reasonable
expectation of success, Lead Prior Art allows for an inference of
prima facie obviousness. That inference, however, is still subject to
qualification and is thus not dispositive on the question of prima facie
obviousness. And as noted, before a determination of prima facie
obviousness may be made, the proponent of obviousness must
establish that the straightforward way leading from the starting point
397. See discussion supra Sections IV.A and IV.B.
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to the solution, a solution would have been pursued with a
"reasonable expectation of success."398
In other words, under Lead Prior Art, the "straightforward way"
does not necessarily equate with a reasonable expectation of success.
The need to evaluate "reasonable expectation of success" arises from
practical considerations in some useful arts. Courts have recognized
that technology in certain fields present a large number of suggestions
in the prior art; i.e., many Lead Prior Art starting points and many
straightforward modifications would have been suggested to a
POSITA by the prior art. In some circumstances, however, the prior
art may not offer any guidance for how someone should evaluate the
many options suggested by the prior art and test a practical number of
the suggested approaches. For example, cases have addressed
circumstances where reasons existed for considering a very large
number of scenarios.399 So, even though the way to test might have
been straightforward, the POSITA would have abandoned the venture
because there would have been simply too many choices to proceed
and no reasonable way to identify a choice expected to be successful.
The Federal Circuit has specifically also recognized that, where
the prior art offers numerous suggestions, without guidance on how to
select from those suggestions, a patentable invention may lie in
identifying a solution from among the many suggestions.
In [some] cases .. .researchers can only "vary all parameters or try
each of numerous possible choices until one possibly arrive[s] at a
successful result, where the prior art [gives] either no indication of
which parameters [are] critical or no direction as to which of many
possible choices is likely to be successful." In re O'Farrell, 853
F.2d 894, 903 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In such cases, "courts should not
succumb to hindsight claims of obviousness." In re Kubin, 561
F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Similarly, patents are not barred just
because it was obvious "to explore a new technology or general
approach that seemed to be a promising field of experimentation,
where the prior art gave only general guidance as to the particular
form of the claimed invention or how to achieve it." In re
O'Farrell, 853 F.2d at 903.400
398. See discussion supra Section III.
399. See Yamanouchi Pharm. Co. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 231 F.3d 1339, 1341-42
(Fed. Cir. 2000) ("Of the 11,000 candidates for suitable compounds, fewer than fifty showed
enough promise to warrant human clinical trials. Ultimately, the [Food and Drug
Administration] approved only four for consumer use. . . .").
400. Procter & Gamble Co. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 989, 996-97
(Fed. Cir. 2009).
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Lead Prior Art credits the notion of "reasonable expectations of
success" by treating a traversal from a starting point to the solution as
an inference of prima facie obviousness rather than a conclusion of
prima facie obvious (subject to potential rebuttal). The persuasive
value of that inference must be weighed against whether a
"reasonable expectation of success" would exist under the
circumstances, as discussed above. Thereafter, if a "reasonable
expectation of success" would not exist, the inference of prima facie
obviousness is negated and the claimed invention is nonobvious
because it is not prima facie obvious; otherwise, the inference of
prima facie obviousness prevails and the claimed invention is prima
facie obvious. Note that under such circumstances, the inference is
negated, not rebutted, and advantages flowing therefrom have been
discussed above.401
Although the preceding discussion has shown that Lead Prior Art
has the capacity to indicate more objectively whether a claimed
invention is nonobvious or is prima facie obvious, such capabilities
merely represent the barest of provisions for evaluating obviousness.
Over the last 220-plus years, patent law has identified certain
patentability considerations that we discussed as "negative rules for
invention" 40 2 and other affirmative considerations that support
nonobviousness, such as "unexpected results" and "reasonable
expectations of success." Over the years, settled expectations have
been created concerning the applicability of these principles going
forward.
Fortunately, Lead Prior Art harmonizes rather than disturbs these
principles by naturally providing consistent results with the above-
mentioned doctrines while tending to avoid argument-based
pigeonholing of factual circumstances into one of these doctrines. A
comparison of results from Lead Prior Art to the results that would be
expected when invoking each negative rule for invention is discussed
in the following section.
D. Lead Prior Art Harmonizes Existing Obviousness Rubric
Lead Prior Art accommodates a range of situations, from a
POSITA facing a small number of suggestions in the prior art, to a
POSITA facing a large number of suggestions in the prior art.
Additionally, Lead Prior Art considers whether the likelihood of
success for those suggestions ranges from "implausible" to
401. See discussion supra Section II.B.2.
402. See discussion supra Section 1LA.2.
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"plausible"4 03 to "certain." 4 0 4 Finally, in situations where a POSITA
may face a large number of suggestions, Lead Prior Art considers
whether the prior art included guidance for selecting a path forward
among the many situations, all of which could well have been
straightforward. Each situation is discussed below.
First, Lead Prior Art properly takes into account a situation
where any number of teachings or suggestions are present in the
sensible prior art starting point(s) and each performs exactly in
combination as would be expected. The POSITA in this situation
would have readily recognized and straightforwardly achieved the
combination that led to the claimed invention, based on iterating
through the starting points and straightforward modifications with a
reasonable expectation of success in solving the problem, and the
combination would have performed as expected. In that scenario,
whether the number of teachings or suggestions is large or small does
not affect the result in Lead Prior Art or under existing precedent
because a POSITA would have recognized each teaching or
suggestion necessary to reaching a solution. This correlates well with
the existing obviousness rubric, which holds that the number of
references or suggestions to be combined is not determinative for
prima facie obviousness,405 but the nature of the teachings or
suggestions can be determinative. Lead Prior Art could hold that this
claimed invention was prima facie obvious, 40 6 consistent with existing
403. An example where the likelihood of success would be "plausible" is where a
reference suggested but did not expressly teach a particular aspect of the claimed invention.
Without express knowledge that the suggestion would have been viable, the POSITA would not
have known that the POSITA could achieve the solution through that suggestion. An example
where the likelihood of success would be "implausible" is where a reference "teaches away"
from the claimed invention. If a reference suggests that no likelihood of success for the claimed
invention, the POSITA would not have known that the POSITA could achieve the solution
through modifying that reference. See discussion of "teaching away," supra Section Il.A. I.d; In
re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("A reference may be said to teach away when a
person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the
path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was
taken by the applicant. The degree of teaching away will of course depend on the particular
facts; in general, a reference will teach away if it suggests that the line of development flowing
from the reference's disclosure is unlikely to be productive of the result sought by the
applicant.").
404. An example where a likelihood of success would be "certain" would be where a prior
art element was disclosed as having certain properties, and those properties were not affected in
any way when the prior art element was combined with other elements.
405. See M.P.E.P., supra note 59, at § 2145 ("Reliance on a large number of references in
a rejection does not, without more, weigh against the obviousness of the claimed invention.")
(citing In re Gorman,, 933 F.2d 982, 986 (Fed. Cir. 1991)) ("Gorman argues that when it is
necessary to combine the teachings of a large number of references in order to support a
rejection for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006), this of itself weighs against a holding of
obviousness. The criterion, however, is not the number of references, but what they would have
meant to a person of ordinary skill in the field of the invention.").
406. See discussion supra Section II.B.
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precedent concerning "known elements producing expected
results." 4 07 Absent an ability to destroy that prima facie case, the
patent applicant/patentee would then be forced to rebut that prima
facie case through an appropriate evidentiary showing.
Second, Lead Prior Art also properly credits a situation where a
small, finite number of teachings or suggestions are present in the
prior art and each teaching or suggestion's likelihood of success could
range from "low" to "very high" (but would not be "certain"). Here,
the number of combinations the POSITA would have had to test or
verify to reach the solution would have been relatively small, and as
long as there is a reasonable likelihood of success with any particular
one of that small number of suggestions, there would be a tendency
towards finding prima facie obviousness. This result matches what the
existing obviousness rubric would mandate under the "obvious to try"
doctrine.408 Again, the patent applicant/patentee would then be forced
to rebut that prima facie case through an appropriate evidentiary
showing.
Third, Lead Prior Art also properly accommodates a situation
where a solution exists in the real world but the POSITA would not
have been able to achieve it regardless of the teachings and
suggestions in the prior art. One potential explanation for the POSITA
failing to reach the solution could be that results achieved by the real
world inventor represent an "unexpected result." 40 9 An unexpected
result, i.e., no reasonable expectation of success, could exist where
either a teaching or suggestion in the prior art does not produce the
properties expected of it in the POSITA's modified starting point.
Since the inventor's unexpected result is, by definition, not something
that the prior art would teach or suggest, the POSITA would have
been incapable of identifying that solution.
Another potential explanation for the POSITA failing to reach
the solution could be that something in the prior art included a "teach
away, 410 that discouraged the POSITA from pursuing certain
suggestions therein. Since the POSITA would not have pursued a
suggestion in the presence of a persuasive teach away, as discussed in
Section II.A.1.d, supra, the POSITA would not have considered that
prior art to have been a sensible starting point because the POSITA
would have been incapable of identifying a solution that went against
a teaching away. Accordingly, in either situation, Lead Prior Art
407. See discussion supra Section II.A.2.
408. See discussion supra Section II.A.2.
409. See discussion supra Section II.A. I.d.
410. See discussion supra Section II.A.I.d.
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properly credits the circumstances and renders a conclusion of
nonobviousness.
Lastly, Lead Prior Art properly accommodates a situation where
the number of teachings or suggestions in the prior art is relatively
high but the prior art offers no guidance to direct the efforts of the
POSITA toward finding a viable solution. One might think that if any
individual combination of sensible starting point and sensible
modification was at least somewhat likely to be a solution to the
POSITA's problem, a reasonable expectation of success would exist
for reaching the solution through only modest, straightforward
experimentation. Therefore, the argument would be that the POSITA
would have readily identified a sensible starting point and one or
more sensible modifications that would have led to the solution. But if
there is no guidance on which of the relatively high number of
possibilities should even be pursued, there is a failure of sensible
starting point. Courts and Lead Prior Art agree that such
circumstances reflect prima facie obviousness.
From the preceding discussion, readers will recognize that Lead
Prior Art shows promise for achieving consistent results with existing
obviousness rubric under factual circumstances that suggest one of
the "negative rules for invention" as well as affirmative
considerations such as "unexpected results." Accordingly, Lead Prior
Art should be consistent with settled expectations of how obviousness
analysis should resolve for relatively easy determinations while
providing a more objective, defensible, and transparent obviousness
determination for more difficult determinations.
A question remaining to be addressed prior to summarizing this
article pertains to whether our methodology is justified in attempting
to reach the claimed invention and whether doing so introduces
hindsight bias. We address these questions next.
E. Does Our Analytical Approach Rely on Any Hindsight Bias?
Near the beginning of the Lead Prior Art portion of this article,
the authors made a remarkable claim: to show that our methodology
could rely on an a priori knowledge of the claimed invention when
selecting starting points and modifications to those starting points but
yet not be influenced by hindsight knowledge. The time to address
this issue has arrived, and the explanation is rather simple.
Indeed, an element of hindsight does exist in the sense that we
are relying on a prior knowledge of the claimed invention. But that
hindsight does not affect the result of our analysis; it merely helps us
to avoid irrelevant combinations, thereby reducing the burden of
applying Lead Prior Art analysis and allowing us to focus our interest
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on starting points and modifications that are relevant to whether the
claimed invention is in fact prima facie obvious. Accordingly, a pinch
of hindsight in taking into account the claimed invention is necessary,
but Lead Prior Art neutralizes that necessary pinch of hindsight in a
practical, unbiased, and inherently appropriate way.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, this article has forwarded the concept of Lead
Prior Art methodology to identify, in a more objective way, the piece
or pieces of Lead Prior Art that constitute sensible starting points for
the POSITA in attempting to solve a problem. As has been seen, there
can be no prima facie case of obviousness if non-sensible prior art
starting points are chosen.
The authors have contemplated how the USPTO, pressed by
time and resources, would be able to conduct practical examinations
in a world of Lead Prior Art. It would seem that would be difficult.
An easier way for the USPTO to proceed would be to utilize hindsight
knowledge of the claimed invention to reject claims based on prior art
that is structurally most similar to that claimed invention. Hence, in
practice, application of Lead Prior Art methodology might most often
be applied by the patent applicant simply to establish that in fact the
USPTO has chosen an incorrect prior art starting point. By analogy to
the litigated facts of Takeda, Daichi, and Eisai, and utilizing the 2010
KSR guidelines, that alone might lead to allowance.
A different scenario might ensue in litigation. In such litigations,
the opponent often has great abundances of both time and skilled
legal and technical resources to attempt to have patent claims
adjudicated to be obvious. Hence, it is possible that the alleged
infringer will come up with better prior art than did the USPTO. As in
prosecution, application of the Lead Prior Art methodology might
find principal use by the patentee in litigation in establishing that the
prior art asserted against the patent claims is not a sensible starting
point(s). Lead Prior Art provides an additional arrow in the quiver:
the patentee may be able to show that the prior art asserted, even if a
sensible starting point, cannot be applied straightforwardly in the
hands of POSITA to achieve the claimed invention with a reasonable
expectation of success.
And of course, Lead Prior Art is not a panacea for patent
applicants/patentees. The facts may be such that the art asserted is a
sensible starting point, leading straight forwardly to the claimed
invention with a reasonable expectation of success.
But whether the patentee/patent applicant wins or loses, Lead
Prior Art, when properly applied, should minimize hindsight and
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provide a more objective basis for making the critical determination
under § 103. In and of itself, that would be a great step forward for
the U.S. Patent System.
* * *
